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4-8, 1978. A  r e v i s e d  v e r s i o n  was p r e s e n t e d  a t  t h e  Conference on L i f e  Cyc le  
Aspec ts  o f  Employment, M t .  K i s c o ,  New York, October  18-20, 1978, sponsored 
by t h e  S o c i a l  Sc ience  Research C o u n c i l .  The p r e s e n t  v e r s i o n  d i f f e r s ' f r o m  
t h e  e a r l i e r  v e r s i o n s  p r i m a r i l y  i n  t h e  n u m e r i c a l  r e s u l t s ,  wh ich  c o r r e c t  
e r r o r s  i n  t h e ' d a t a  a n a l y z e d  i n  t h e  e a r l i e r  v e r s i o n s .  The p r e s e n t  v e r s i o n  
b e n e f i t s  f r o m  t h e  h e l p f u l  comments on e a r l i e r  v e r s i o n s  made by M ichae l  T .  
Hannan, Joanne J u l i u s ,  C a m i l l e  Marder,  John W .  Meyer, B u r t o n  S inge r ,  L o u i s e  
Smi th-Dona ls  and A r t h u r  St inchombe. 
The r e s e a r c h  r e p o r t e d  i n  t h i s  paper  was s u p p o r t e d  by t h e  N a t i o n a l  I n s t i t u t e  
o f  E d u c a t i o n  Gran t  #NIE-G-76-0082 and by t h e  S o c i a l  Sc ience  Research 
C o u n c i l .  I u i s h  t o  thank Glenn C a r r o l l ,  C a m i l l e  f la rder ,  Gary Sandefur  and 
Barba ra  Warsavage f o r  v a l u a b l e  r e s e a r c h  a s s i s t a n c e  and Roy S u t t o n  f o r  
programming a s s i s t a n c e .  The I n t e r n a t i o n a l  I n s t i t u t e  f o r  A p p l i e d  Systems 
A n a l y s i s  p r o v i d e d  a  s u p p o r t i v e  atmosphere f o r  c o m p l e t i o n  o f  t h e  f i n a l  
r e v i s i o n s  t o  t h i s  paper .  
A r e c u r r i n g  theme i n  t h e  l i t e r a t u r e  on l a b o r  m a r k e t  s t r u c t u r e  i s  t h a t  
d i f f e r e n t  l a b o r  m a r k e t s  a r e  c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by  d i f f e r e n t  p a t t e r n s  o f  j o b  
m o b i l i t y .  For  example, D o e r i n g e r  and P i o r e  (1971, p.  401 r e g a r d  s t a b i l i t y  
o f  employment as " t h e  most  s a l i e n t  f e a t u r e  o f  t h e  f n t e r n a l  l a b o r  marke t . "  
K e r r  (1954, pp. 95-96) c o n t r a s t s  * * s t r u c t u r e l e s s 4 *  m a r k e t s  t h a t  l a c k  
" b a r r i e r s  t o  t h e  m o b i l i t y  o f  workers"  w i t h  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  m a r k e t s  i n  wh ich  
en t rance ,  movement and e x i t  a r e  c o n s t r a i n e d  by r u l e s .  S p i l e r m a n  (1977) 
emphasizes c a r e e r  l i n e s ,  n o t i n g  how these  may depend n o t  o n l y  on p e r s o n a l  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  b u t  a l s o  on t h e  occupa t i on ,  i n d u s t r y  and f i r m  o f  a  person 's  
p o r t  o f  e n t r y .  
Not  everyone ag rees  t h a t  j o b - s h i f t  p a t t e r n s  r e f l e c t  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n ,  
l a b o r  marke t  s t r u c t u r e .  Some a t t r i b u t e  t h e s e  d i f f e r e n c e s  t o  v a r i o u s  l a b o r  
market  i m p e r f e c t i o n s :  s e a r c h  c o s t s  ( O i ,  19621, s p e c i f i c  i n v e s t m e n t s  
(Becker,  19641, u n c e r t a i n t y  (Becker e t  a l . ,  19771, and so f o r t h .  O t h e r s  
(e -g . ,  Heckman and W i l l i s ,  1977; D o e r i n g e r  and P i o r e ,  1971, pp.  175-1761 
a s s o c i a t e  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  j o b - s h i f t  p a t t e r n s  w i t 1 1  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  u o r k e r s :  
i n  nonmarket  p r o d u c t i v i t y ,  i n  p r e f e r e n c e s  f o r  l e i s u r e  v e r s u s  money and 
p r e s t i g e ,  and so f o r t h .  Even t h o s e  who a t t r i b u t e  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  j o b - s h i f t  
p a t t e r n s  t o  l a b o r  m a r k e t  s t r u c t u r e  do n o t  ag ree  on t h e  b o u n d a r i e s  o f  l a b o r  
m a r k e t s  o r  on t h e  reasons  why occupan ts  o f  c e r t a i n  k i n d s  o f  j o b s  have 
s i m i l a r  j o b - s h i f t  p a t t e r n s .  
R e s o l u t i o n  o f  t h e s e  d i sag reemen ts  r e q u i r e s  an e x p l a n a t i o n  o f  t h e  fo rms 
o f  l a b o r  marke t  s t r u c t u r e  and o f  t h e  consequences o f  t hese  fo rms f o r  job-  
s h i f t  p a t t e r n s .  I t  a l s o  r e q u i r e s  t r a n s l a t i o n  o f  v e r b a l  e x p l a n a t i o n s  i n t o  
t e s t a b l e  models,  d a t a  t h a t  a l l o w  compet ing  e x p l a n a t i o n s  t o  be t e s t e d ,  and a 
method f o r  o r g a n i z i n g  t h e  d a t a  so  t h a t  consequences o f  compet ing  arguments 
can c o n f r o n t  one a n o t h e r .  T h i s  paper  r e p o r t s  r e s e a r c h  t h a t  a t t e m p t s  t o  
b e g i n  r e s o l v i n g  these  d i sag reemen ts .  I t  i s  o r g a n i z e d  as  f o l l o w s .  S e c t i o n  
I c o n t a i n s  d e f i n i t i o n s  o f  b a s i c  te rms.  S e c t i o n  I 1  r e v i e w s  s e v e r a l  t h e o r i e s  
o f  l a b o r  m a r k e t  s t r u c t u r e  and s u g g e s t s  hypo theses  abou t  j o b  s h i f t s  
c o n g r u e n t  w i t h  t hese  e x p l a n a t i o n s .  S e c t i o n  I 1 1  d e s c r i b e s  t h e  models,  
methods and d a t a  used i n  t e s t i n g  these  hypotheses.  S e c t i o n  I V  r e p o r t s  t h e  
r e s u l  t s .  
I. BASIC TERNS 
Labor Marke t .  Cons ide r  a  sys tem w i t h  uncoerced exchanges between t h r e e  
k i n d s  o f  p a r t i e s :  employees (A) ,  emp loye rs  ( 8 1 ,  and consumers (C ) .  
Suppose A  p e r f o r m s  t a s k s  f o r  B  i n  r e t u r n  f o r  money, B  exchanges t h e  
p r o d u c t s  o f  A's l a b o r  w i t h  C f o r  money, and A  and C do n o t  exchange 
d i r e c t l y  w i t h  one a n o t h e r .  #'Labor marketJ'  r e f e r s  t o  t h e  f i r s t  s e t  o f  
exchanges; "p roduc t  market' '  r e f e r s  t o  t h e  second s e t  o f  exchanges. 
A c c o r d i n g  t o  t h i s  d e f i n i t i o n ,  t h e  l a b o r  m a r k e t  does n o t  i n c l u d e  t h o s e  who 
consume what  t h e y  produce (e .g . ,  p e a s a n t s ) ,  t hose  who a r e  n o t  p a i d  f o r  
t h e i r  l a b o r  (e.g. ,  s l a v e s ,  p r i s o n e r s ,  v o l u n t e e r s ) ,  and those  who exchange 
t h e i r  l a b o r  d i r e c t l y  u i t h  t h e  consumer (e.g. ,  t hose  uho a r e  s e l f - e m p l o y e d ) .  
Labor  Marke t  S t r u c t u r e .  V a r i a b i l i t y  i n  usage makes i t  somewhat 
d i f f i c u l t  t o  d e f i n e  l a b o r  m a r k e t  s t r u c t u r e . '  T h i s  v a r i a b i l i t y ,  more t h a n  
d i sag reemen ts  about  a c t u a l  e m p i r i c a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p s ,  seems t o  be  a  m a j o r  
s o u r c e  o f  a rguments  abou t  whether  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  has  a  s i n g l e  l a b o r  
marke t ,  d u a l  marke ts ,  o r  m u l t i p l e  (segmented) marke ts .  An a c c u r a t e  t a l l y  
i s  p r o b a b l y  u n i m p o r t a n t .  What m a t t e r s  i s  t h e  answer t o  t h e  q u e s t i o n s  
u n d e r l y i n g  these  deba tes .  I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  i s  t h e r e  a  s i n g l e  p r o c e s s  by 
wh ich  peop le  a r e  a l l o c a t e d  t o  j o b s  and rewards  a r e  d i s t r i b u t e d  among them? 
O r ,  a r e  t h e r e  s e v e r a l  d i f f e r e n t  p r o c e s s e s ?  I f  s e v e r a l ,  what a r e  they ,  and 
how and uhy do they  a r i s e ?  I n  t h i s  paper  " l a b o r  marke t  s t r u c t u r e "  r e f e r s  
t o  t h e  b a s i c  f e a t u r e s  and p a t t e r n s  o f  t h e  p rocesses  t h a t  a l l o c a t e  p e o p l e  t o  
d i f f e r e n t i a l l y  rewarded p o s i t i o n s  i n  t h e  l a b o r  m a r k e t .  
11. ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS 
A  fundamental  -- b u t  u s u a l l y  i m p l i c i t  -- premise  o f  t r a d i t i o n a l  
mic roeconomic  t h e o r y  o f  t h e  l a b o r  marke t  i s  t h a t  t h e  main  c o n d i t i o n s  
s u r r o u n d i n g  a  p a r t i c u l a r  job-person match a r e  f l e x i b l e .  That  i s ,  i f  
d e s i r e d ,  an employer can r e a d i l y  r a i s e  o r  l ower  an employee's wage r a t e ,  
and e i t h e r  t h e  employer o r  t h e  employee can t e r m i n a t e  t h e  match  a t  any 
t ime .  
I n  r e c e n t  y e a r s  some economis ts  and s o c i o l o g i s t s  (e.g. ,  Thurow, 1975; 
Sorensen, 1977a; Sorensen and K a l l e b e r g ,  1981) have c l a i m e d  t h a t  i n  many 
s e c t o r s  o f  t h e  U.S. economy, t h e  c o n d i t i o n s  o f  employment a r e  i n f l e x i b l e .  
I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  t h e y  a s s e r t  t h a t  employers  canno t  r e a d i l y  a d j u s t  an 
employee's wage r a t e  ( e s p e c i a l l y  down) and t h a t  t h e  r i g h t  t o  t e r m i n a t e  job-  
p e r s o n  matches has been r e l i n q u i s h e d  by employers,  though n o t  by 
employees.= 
For  t hese  n o t i o n s  t o  have g e n e r a l  t h e o r e t i c a l  va lue ,  p r o p o n e n t s  o f  each 
v iew must e x p l a i n  why employment i s  f l e x i b l e  o r  i n f l e x i b l e .  They must a l s o  
e x p l a i n  how each t y p e  o f  employment c o n d i t i o n  a c c o u n t s  f o r  t h r e e  w e l l -  
documented e m p i r i c a l  g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s :  ( 1 )  a  p o s i t i v e  c r o s s - s e c t i o n a l  
c o r r e l a t i o n  b e t u e e n  j o b  r e w a r d s  (e .g . ,  o c c u p a t i o n a l  p r e s t i g e ,  t h e  wage 
r a t e )  and  p e r s o n a l  r e s o u r c e s  ( e . g . ,  e d u c a t i o n ,  g e n e t i c  endowments) ;  ( 2 )  an 
i n c r e a s e  i n  j o b  r e w a r d s  o v e r  a  pe r son ' s  l i f e  c y c l e ;  ( 3 )  g r e a t e r  emp loyment  
s t a b i l i t y  o f  p e r s o n s  h o l d i n g  j o b s  w i t h  g r e a t e r  r e w a r d s e 3  
I n  t h i s  p a p e r  I make o n l y  p a s s i n g  r e m a r k s  a b o u t  t h e  i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  
each  t y p e  o f  emp loyment  f o r  t h e  f i r s t  and  second  g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s ,  and  I 
a t t e n d  o n l y  b r i e f l y  t o  a r g u m e n t s  a b o u t  why emp loyment  i s  f l e x i b l e  o r  
i n f l e x i b l e .  I n s t e a d ,  I c o n c e n t r a t e  on  c o m p a r i n g  i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  f l e x i b l e  
and i n f l e x i b l e  emp loyment  f o r  j o b - s h i f t  p a t t e r n s .  
1. F l e x i b l e  Emplovment  
P e r f e c t  C o m p e t i t i o n .  Because o f  i t s  s i m p l i c i t y  and t h e o r e t i c a l  
c e n t r a l i t y ,  I b e g i n  w i t h  t h e  e x p l a n a t i o n  t h a t  assumes a s i n g l e ,  p e r f e c t l y  
c o m p e t i t i v e  m a r k e t  f o r  l a b o r .  A number o f  p r e m i s e s ,  i n  a d d i t i o n  t o  
f l e x i b l e  employment ,  u n d e r l i e  t h i s  e x p l a n a t i o n .  One i s  t h a t  g o o d s  
exchanged  i n  t h e  m a r k e t  a r e  homogeneous: p e o p l e  a r e  e q u a l l y  p r o d u c t i v e ,  
and j o b s  a r e  e q u a l l y  a t t r a c t i v e  a s  l o n g  a s  t h e y  pay  t h e  same wage. A 
second  i s  t h a t  b u y e r s  and s e l l e r s  have  p e r f e c t  i n f o r m a t i o n  a b o u t  t h e  g o o d s  
and  p r i c e s  o f f e r e d  i n  t h e  m a r k e t :  no one i s  u n c e r t a i n  a b o u t  t h e  ou tcome o f  
any p o s s i b l e  exchange .  A t h i r d  i s  t h a t  t h e  m a r k e t  c o n t a i n s  many b u y e r s  and  
s e l l e r s :  a l o n e  no  one  c a n  d e t e r m i n e  p r i c e s . ' '  
When emp loyment  i s  f l e x i b l e ,  t h e s e  p o s t u l a t e s  i m p l y  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a  
s i n g l e  p r i c e  f o r  l a b o r  ( i . e . ,  a  s i n g l e  wage r a t e )  i n  a  s h o r t - r u n  
e q u i l i b r i u m .  The f i r s t  e m p i r i c a l  g e n e r a l i z a t i o n  m e n t i o n e d  e a r l i e r  
c o n t r a d i c t s  t h i s ,  a s  Adam S m i t h  and o t h e r  e a r l y  e c o n o m i s t s  r e c o g n i z e d .  
f l i c r o e c o n o m i s t s  commonly a l t e r  t h e  f i r s t  p rem ise  t o  assume t h a t  wo rke rs  
v a r y  i n  p r o d u c t i v i t y  ( a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e i r  e d u c a t i o n ,  s t r e n g t h ,  and so f o r t l ) )  
and t h a t  j o b s  v a r y  i n  nonpecun ia ry  ways ( i n  p r e s t i g e ,  wo rk ing  c o n d i t i o n s ,  
and so f o r t h ) .  The m o d i f i e d  s e t  o f  assumpt ions  p r e d i c t s  a  p o s t i v e  
c o v a r i a t i o n  between j ob  rewards  and p e r s o n a l  r e s o u r c e s  i n  e q u i l i b r i u m ;  i t  
i s  u s u a l l y  te rmed "marg ina l  p r o d u c t i v i t y  theory' '  because i t  p r e d i c t s  t h a t  
each l a b o r e r ' s  m a r g i n a l  u t i l i t y  ( h i s  reward )  e q u a l s  h i s  m a r g i n a l  p r o d u c t  ( a  
f u n c t i o n  o f  h i s  r e s o u r c e s )  i n  e q u i l i b r i u m .  Bu t  t h i s  s e t  o f  assumpt ions  
s t i l l  c a n n o t  e x p l a i n  t h e  second g e n e r a l i z a t i o n  men t ioned  above:  t h e  
t y p i c a l  r i s e  i n  j o b  rewards  ove r  a  person's l i f e  c y c l e .  
Both t h e  f i r s t  and second g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s  a r e  e x p l a i n e d  by human 
c a p i t a l  t h e o r y ,  an e x t e n s i o n  o f  m a r g i n a l  p r o d u c t i v i t y  t h e o r y .  Human 
c a p i t a l  t h e o r y  p o s t u l a t e s  t h a t  wo rke rs  i n v e s t  i n  t h e i r  r e s o u r c e s  
( p r o d u c t i v e  c a p a c i t y )  as  l o n g  as t h e i r  expec ted  r e t u r n  on t h e s e  i n v e s t m e n t s  
exceeds t h e i r  expec ted  d i r e c t  and i n d i r e c t  c o s t s .  Human c a p i t a l  t h e o r y  
p r e d i c t s  t h a t  wo rke rs  i n v e s t  h e a v i l y  i n  t r a i n i n g  (some f o r m a l  and some on- 
t h e - j o b )  when t h e y  a r e  young and reap  t h e  b e n e f i t s  i n  t h e  f o r m  o f  i n c r e a s e d  
wages as t h e y  become o l d e r .  Fur thermore ,  t hose  who i n v e s t  h e a v i l y  i n  t h e i r  
r e s o u r c e s  d u r i n g  y o u t h  have age -ea rn ings  c u r v e s  t h a t  r i s e  more s t e e p l y  t h a n  
t h e  c u r v e s  o f  t hose  whose i n v e s t m e n t s  a r e  s m a l l e r .  
Bu t  what a r e  t h e  i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  m a r g i n a l  p r o d u c t i v i t y  t h e o r y  and human 
c a p i t a l  t h e o r y  f o r  j o b  s h i f t s ?  I n  e q u i l i b r i u m ,  j o b  s h i f t s  do n o t  o c c u r  
because no one can improve upon h i s  p r e s e n t  s i t u a t i o n .  Thus, t h e  
o c c u r r e n c e  o f  a  j ob  s h i f t  i m p l i e s  t h a t  e i t h e r  t h e  employer  o r  t h e  employee 
i s  n o t  i n  e q u i l i b r i u m .  M a r g i n a l  p r o d u c t i v i t y  t h e o r y  s u g g e s t s  a  l i s t  o f  
exogenous changes caus ing  d i s e q u i l i b r i u m ,  b u t  i t  does n o t  e x p l a i n  o r  
how f r e q u e n t l y  d i s e q u i l i b r a t i n g  changes o c c u r .  Out o f  i g n o r a n c e  one m i g h t  
-
h y p o t h e s i z e  t h a t  t hese  d i s e q u i l i b r a t i n g  e v e n t s ,  and t h e  j o b  s h i f t s  
g e n e r a t e d  by them, occu r  a t ' a  random r a t e  a t h a t  does n o t  depend on 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  j o b s  o r  j o b h o l d e r s  (see Sorensen and Tuma, 1981). 
I m p e r f e c t  C o m p e t i t i o n .  V a r i o u s  i m p e r f e c t i o n s  have been p o s t u l a t e d  so 
t h a t  human c a p i t a l  t h e o r y  w i l l  p r e d i c t  d i f f e r e n t i a l  s t a b i l i t y  t h a t  a c c o r d s  
w i t h  t h e  t h i r d  e m p i r i c a l  g e n e r a l i z a t i o n  men t ioned  e a r l i e r .  A good example 
i s  t h e  e x p l a n a t i o n  o f  m a r i t a l  s t a b i l i t y  o f f e r e d  by Becker,  Landes and 
M ichae l  (19771, h e r e a f t e r  r e f e r r e d  t o  as BLM. Because BLH make o n l y  
t a n g e n t i a l  remarks  abou t  j o b  s t a b i l i t y ,  I t r a n s l a t e  t h e i r  arguments abou t  
m a r i t a l  s t a b i l i t y  i n t o  arguments  abou t  t h e  s t a b i l i t y  o f  j ob -pe rson  matches.  
B.Lfl's key  assumpt ions  a r e  t h e  absence o f  p e r f e c t  i n f o r m a t i o n  and t h e  
c o s t l i n e s s  o f  s e a r c h i n g ,  wh ich  l e a d s  t o  t h e  name " i m p e r f e c t  c o m p e t i t i o n * '  
f o r  t h e i r  m o d i f i c a t i o n  o f  human c a p i t a l  t h e o r y .  Employers  must  use 
o b s e r v a b l e  i n d i c a t o r s  o f  a  person 's  r e s o u r c e s  t o  s e l e c t  employees (see a l s o  
Spence, 1974); s i m i l a r l y ,  l a b o r e r s  must  use  o b s e r v a b l e  i n d i c a t o r s  o f  a  
job's rewards  t o  s e l e c t  j obs .  Some mismatches occu r ,  even i n  e q u i l i b r i u m ,  
p a r t l y  because i n d i c a t o r s  a r e  n o t  p e r f e c t l y  r e l i a b l e  and p a r t l y  because 
s e a r c h  i s  c o s t l y .  A s h i f t  o c c u r s  when a  mismatch i s  d i s c o v e r e d  and b o t h  
p a r t n e r s  g a i n  f rom t h e  s h i f t .  T h i s  c o n c l u s i o n  i s  i m p o r t a n t  because 
exogenous changes i n  t h e  s o c i a l  sys tem need n o t  be  i n v o k e d  t o  e x p l a i n  t h e  
e x i s t e n c e  o f  m o b i l i t y .  
BLM a l s o  c o n s i d e r  t h e  d e t e r m i n a n t s  o f  s t a b i l i t y .  T h e i r  argument has  
s e v e r a l  components; I c o n c e n t r a t e  on t h o s e  a s p e c t s  s u g g e s t i n g  e f f e c t s  o f  
r e w a r d s  and  r e s o u r c e s  on  j o b  ~ h i f t s . ~  They r e a s o n  t h a t  s t a b i l i t y  i n c r e a s e s  
w i t h  t h e  e x p e c t e d  g a i n s  f r o m  a  m a t c h  and d e c r e a s e s  w i t h  u n e x p e c t e d  g a i n s  
( t h e  d i s c r e p a n c y  be tween  a c t u a l  and' e x p e c t e d  g a i n s ) ,  assuming  e x p e c t e d  and 
u n e x p e c t e d  g a i n s  do n o t  have  a  s t r o n g  n e g a t i v e  ~ o r r e l a t i o n . ~  Expec ted  g a i n s  
r i s e  w i t h  i n c r e a s e s  i n  t r a i t s  p o s i t i v e l y  a s s o c i a t e d  i n  an  o p t i m a l  s o r t i n g  
o f  a l l  p o t e n t i a l  exchange p a r t n e r s  i n  t h e  s y s t e m  (Becke r ,  1974) .  S i n c e  t h e  
s k i l l  l e v e l  o f  a  j o b  and  a  p e r s o n ' s  e d u c a t i o n  a r e  comp lemen ta r y  t r a i t s ,  
t h e y  a r e  p o s i t i v e l y  a s s o c i a t e d  i n  an  o p t i m a l  s o r t i n g .  T h e r e f o r e ,  
employment  s t a b i l i t y  i s  h y p o t h e s i z e d  t o  i n c r e a s e  w i t h  p e r s o n a l  r e s o u r c e s  
and j o b  rewa rds ,  assuming  j o b  r e w a r d s  p a r t l y  r e f l e c t  a  j o b ' s  s k i l l  l e v e l .  
A n o t h e r  way o f  s t a t i n g  t h i s  h y p o t h e s i s  i s  t h a t :  
Under  i m p e r f e c t  c o m p e t i t i o n ,  t h e  r a t e  o f  l e a v i n g  a  j o b  
f a l l s  a s  j o b  r e w a r d s  and  p e r s o n a l  r e s o u r c e s  r i s e .  
I n  sum, i m p e r f e c t  c o m p e t i t i o n  p r e d i c t s  t h e  t h i r d  e m p i r i c a l  g e n e r a l i z a t i o n ,  
a s  n e l l  a s  t h e  f i r s t  two .  
A l t h o u g h  BLM e x p l a i n  d i f f e r e n t i a l  s t a b i l i t y  o f  matches,  t h e y  have  
l i t t l e  t o  say  a b o u t  t h e  l e v e l  o f  r e w a r d s  i n  s u c c e s s i v e  matches ,  p e r h a p s  
because  t h e y  a r e  d i s c u s s i n g  m a r r i a g e s .  B u t  f l e x i b l e  employment  h a s  c l e a r  
i m p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  be tween  r e w a r d s  o f  t h e  j o b s  e n t e r e d  and  
l e f t  ( h e r e a f t e r  c a l l e d  t h e  chanse  jr~ r e w a r d s ) :  i t  i s  z e r o  on  t h e  ave rage .  
Rewards r i s e  ( d e c l i n e )  i f  a  pe rson ' s  r e s o u r c e s  r i s e  ( d e c l i n e ) ,  b u t  t h i s  
o c c u r s  w i t h i n  a  j o b  because  employment  i s  f l e x i b l e .  A c c o r d i n g  t o  t h i s  
t h e o r e t i c a l  p e r s p e c t i v e ,  j o b  s h i f t s  a r e  n o t  n e c e s s a r y  t o  o b t a i n  r e n a r d s  
commensurate w i t h  one's r e s o u r c e s .  S h i f t s  o c c u r  because  m isma tches  a r e  
d i s c o v e r e d  and  c a n  be  r e s o l v e d .  On a v e r a g e  g a i n s  b a l a n c e  l o s s e s ,  a s  l o n g  
as  each p a r t n e r  i s  e q u a l l y  l i k e l y  t o  b e n e f i t  f r o m  n e u l y  a c q u i r e d  
i n f o r m a t i o n  and f r o m  u n e x p e c t e d  g a i n s .  
To be  c o n c r e t e ,  suppose t h a t  t h e  change i n  r e u a r d s  i s  d i v i d e d  i n t o  
t h r e e  c a t e g o r i e s :  a  g a i n ,  a  l o s s ,  and no change.  The above d i s c u s s i o n  
s u g g e s t s  t h e  h y p o t h e s i s  t h a t :  
Under i m p e r f e c t  c o m p e t i t i o n ,  t h e  r a t e  o f  a j o b  s h i f t  
l e a d i n g  t o  a  g a i n  ( a n  u p u a r d  s h i f t )  e q u a l s  t h e  r a t e  o f  a  
j o b  s h i f t  l e a d i n g  t o  a  l o s s  ( a  dounua rd  s h i f t ) .  
The r a t e  o f  a  s h i f t  w i t h  no change i n  r e w a r d s  ( a  l a t e r a l  s h i f t )  may o c c u r  
- 
a t  a  d i f f e r e n t  r a t e  t h a n  upward  and downward s h i f t s  because o f  s p e c i a l  
c o n d i t i o n s  o f  a  j o b . 8  
I t  i s  a l s o  p o s s i b l e  t o  t e a s e  o u t  h y p o t h e s e s  a b o u t  t h e  e f f e c t s  o f  
r e w a r d s  and r e s o u r c e s  on r a t e s  o f  upuard ,  downward and l a t e r a l  s h i f t s .  L e t  
D r e p r e s e n t  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  be tween t h e  r e w a r d s  o b t a i n e d  i n  a  j o b  and t h o s e  
e x p e c t e d  on t h e  b a s i s  o f  a  person 's  r e s o u r c e s .  As a r g u e d  above, a d d i n g  t h e  
a s s u m p t i o n  o f  i m p e r f e c t  i n f o r m a t i o n  t o  h u m a n - c a p i t a l  t h e o r y  i m p l i e s  t h a t  D 
has  a  random ( s y m m e t r i c )  d i s t r i b u t i o n  w i t h  a  mean o f  z e r o .  Fo r  p o s i t i v e  D, 
t h e  employee i s  ove r rewarded ;  f o r  n e g a t i v e  D, unde r rewarded .  Because o f  
r e g r e s s i o n  t owards  t h e  mean, s h i f t s  a r e  more l i k e l y  t o  be downward when D 
i s  p o s i t i v e  and upward  when D i s  n e g a t i v e .  Bu t ,  o t h e r  t h i n g s  b e i n g  e q u a l ,  
D i s  an i n c r e a s i n g  f u n c t i o n  o f  o b s e r v a b l e  j o b  r e w a r d s  and a d e c r e a s i n g  
f u n c t i o n  o f  an  employee's o b s e r v a b l e  r e s o u r c e s .  These i d e a s  l e a d  t o  t h e  
f o l l o w i n g  h y p o t h e s e s :  
Under i m p e r f e c t  c o m p e t i t i o n ,  t h e  r a t e  o f  a  dounward s h i f t  
i n c r e a s e s  w i t h  j o b  r e w a r d s  and d e c r e a s e s  w i t h  p e r s o n a l  
r e s o u r c e s .  I n  c o n t r a s t ,  t h e  r a t e  o f  an  u p u a r d  s h i f t  
dec reases  w i t h  j o b  r e u a r d s  and i n c r e a s e s  w i t h  p e r s o n a l  
r e s o u r c e s .  
A h i n t  o f  t h i s  a rgumen t ,  s i m i l a r  t o  one s k e t c h e d  b y  Tuma (19761,  a p p e a r s  i n  
BLM's p a p e r  (1977,  p .  1145) .  
A l t h o u g h  i m p e r f e c t  c o m p e t i t i o n  does  p r e d i c t  t h e  t h i r d  g e n e r a l i z a t i o n  
and does  g e n e r a t e  h y p o t h e s e s  a b o u t  e f f e c t s  o f  r e w a r d s  and r e s o u r c e s  on t h e  
r a t e  o f  upwa rd  and downward s h i f t s ,  i t  i s  i m p o r t a n t  t o  s t r e s s  t h a t  m o b i l i t y  
p l a c e s  no  m a j o r  r o l e  i n  the p r o c e s s  & w h i c h  r e w a r d s  a r e  d i f f e r e n t i a l l y  
d i s t r i b u t e d  amonq p e o p l e .  I n  c o n t r a s t ,  mob i  1  i t y  i s  c e n t r a l  i f  employment  
i s  i n f l e x i b l e ,  a s  o u t l i n e d  b e l o w .  
2. J n f l e x i b l e  Emplovment  
Under  c o n d i t i o n s  o f  i n f l e x i b l e  employment ,  e m p l o y e r s  t e r m i n a t e  
emp loyees  o n l y  r a r e l y  and  do n o t  a d j u s t  wages t o  t h e  p r o d u c t i v i t y  o f  
j o b h o l d e r s  i n  t h e  s h o r t  r u n .  Because o f  t h i s , .  e m p l o y e r s  have  a  s t r o n g  
i n c e n t i v e  t o  h i r e  t h e  "bes t "  p e o p l e  -- t h o s e  wi th  t h e  m o s t  p e r s o n a l  
r e s o u r c e s .  S i m i l a r l y ,  emp loyees  have  a  s t r o n g  i n c e n t i v e  t o  a c c e p t  t h e  
"bes t "  j o b s  -- t h o s e  w i t h  t h e  g r e a t e s t  r e w a r d s .  Thus, t h e  a s s u m p t i o n  o f  
i n f l e x i b l e  emp loyment  a l s o  p r e d i c t s  t h e  f i r s t  e m p i r i c a l  g e n e r a l i z a t i o n :  a  
p o s i t i v e  c o r r e l a t i o n  be tween  r e w a r d s  and  r e s o u r c e s  i n  a  c r o s s - s e c t i o n .  
When emp loyment  i s  i n f l e x i b l e ,  a n  emp loyee  l e a v e s  a  j o b  o n l y  because  o f  
a c c e s s  t o  a  b e t t e r  job ;  hence  t h e  g a i n  f r o m  a  j o b  s h i f t  i s  p o s i t i v e  on  t h e  
ave rage .  Rewards r i s e  o v e r  t h e  l i f e  c y c l e  f o r  p e o p l e  who s h i f t  j o b s ,  b u t  
n o t  f o r  t h o s e  who r e m a i n  i n  t h e  same j o b .  Thus, t h e  a s s u m p t i o n  o f  
i n f l e x i b l e  emp loyment  p r e d i c t s  t h e  second  e m p i r i c a l  g e n e r a l i z a t i o n ,  t o o .  
More i m p o r t a n t l y ,  when employment  is i n f l e x i b l g ,  job s h i f t s  a r e  t h e  
f u n d a m e n t a l  means b y  w h i c h  p e o p l e  i n c r e a s e  job r e w a r d s .  
Job C o m p e t i t i o n .  Thurow (1975)  assumes t h a t  j o b s  u i t h  t h e  h i g h e s t  
-
r e u a r d s  r e q u i r e  t h e  most  s k i l l s  and t h e  l o n g e s t  t r a i n i n g  p e r i o d .  He a r g u e s  
t h a t  p e o p l e  a r e  a l l o c a t e d  t o  j o b s  w i t h  d i f f e r e n t  t r a i n i n g  r e q u i r e m e n t s  on 
t h e  b a s i s  o f  t h e i r  p e r s o n a l  r e s o u r c e s ,  w h i c h  s e r v e  p r i m a r i l y  as  i n d i c a t o r s  
o f  t h e i r  t r a i n a b i l i t y ,  and n o t  o f  t h e i r  e x i s t i n g  p r o d u c t i v i t y .  T r a i n i n g  
o c c u r s  m a i n l y  on t h e  job,  o r ,  a s  Thurow p u t s  i t , j o b s  a r e  t r a i n i n g  s l o t s .  
I m p l i c i t l y  Thurow assumes t h a t  employment c o n d i t i o n s  a r e  i n f l e x i b l e .  
Thurow m a i n l y  w i s h e s  t o  show t h a t  j o b  c o m p e t i t i o n  p r e d i c t s  a  p o s i t i v e  
c o r r e l a t i o n  be tween r e u a r d s  and r e s o u r c e s  and a  r i s e  i n  r e u a r d s  o v e r  t h e  
l i f e  c y c l e .  He g i v e s  l i t t l e  a t t e n t i o n  t o  i t s  i m p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  j o b - s h i f t  
p a t t e r n s .  t i e v e r t h e l e s s ,  h i s  r emarks  c l e a r l y  i m p l y  t h a t  t h e  change i n  
r e u a r d s  f r om s h i f t i n g  jobs ,  D ,  i s  p o s i t i v e  on t h e  ave rage .  T h i s  i m p l i e s  
t h a t :  
Under j o b  c o m p e t i t i o n ,  t h e  r a t e  o f  an upward s h i f t  i s  much 
l a r g e r  t h a n  t h e  r a t e  o f  a  downward s h i f t .  
G i ven  Thurow's l a c k  o f  i n t e r e s t  i n  j o b  s h i f t s ,  i t  i s  n o t  s u r p r i s i n g  
t h a t  t h e  i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  h i s  a rguments  f o r  t h e  e f f e c t s  o f  r e w a r d s  and 
r e s o u r c e s  on r a t e s  o f  j o b  s h i f t s  a r e  ambiguous.  A c c o r d i n g  t o  one p o s s i b l e  
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ,  p e r s o n a l  r e s o u r c e s  b o t h  i n c r e a s e  w i t h  work e x p e r i e n c e  and 
depend on t h e  k i n d s  o f  j o b s  h e l d  i n  t h e  p a s t .  T h i s  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  t h e  
i n c r e a s e  i n  r e s o u r c e s  f r o m  o n - t h e - j o b  t r a i n i n g  r i s e s  u i t h  t h e  s k i l l  l e v e l  
o f  t h e  job ,  a s  i n d i c a t e d  by  i t s  r e w a r d s .  T h e r e f o r e ,  a s  a  pe rson ' s  
r e s o u r c e s  and t r a i n i n g  i n c r e a s e ,  a  s h i f t  t o  a j o b  w i t h  more r e u a r d s  ( i . e . ,  
one p r o v i d i n g  more t r a i n i n g )  becomes more l i k e l y .  T h i s  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  
l e a d s  t o  t h e  h y p o t h e s i s  t h a t :  
Under j o b  c o m p e t i t i o n ,  t h e  r a t e  o f  an  upward s h i f t  
i n c r e a s e s  w i t h  r e s o u r c e s  a t  t h e  s t a r t  o f  t h e  j ob ,  such  a s  
e d u c a t i o n  and l e n g t h  o f  work e x p e r i e n c e ,  and w i t h  j o b  
rewards ,  wh i ch  i n d i c a t e  t h e  l e v e l  o f  s k i l l s  t h a t  can  be  
acqu- i  r e d  i n  o n - t h e -  j o b  t r a i n i n g .  
No te  t h a t  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h i s  h y p o t h e s i s ,  t h e  e f f e c t s  o f  r e w a r d s  on t h e  r a t e  
o f  an upward s h i f t  a r e  e x a c t l y  o p p o s i t e  t h o s e  p r e d i c t e d  by i m p e r f e c t  
c o m p e t i t i o n .  The # ' r i ch f '  [ t h o s e  i n  h i g h l y  r ewarded  j o b s )  a r e  t h o s e  most  
1  ike.1 y  t~ become " r i c h e r f '  [ p romo ted  t o  more h i g h 1  y  rewarded  j o b s ) .  
Vacancy C o m p e t i t i o n .  As m e n t i o n e d  above, i t  i s  n o t  c o m p l e t e l y  c l e a r  
f r o m  Thurow's remarks  whe the r  he  c l a i m s  t h a t  a c q u i r e d  r e s o u r c e s  ( a s  
i n d i c a t e d  by j o b  r e w a r d s  and work e x p e r i e n c e )  i n f  1 uence emp loye rs '  
s e l e c t i o n  o f  p e r s o n s  t o  f i l l  j o b s .  Sorensen (1977a)  assumes e x p l i c i t l y  
t h a t  t h e y  do n o t ,  i . e . ,  t h a t  r e s o u r c e s  a r e  f i x e d  o v e r  a  pe rson ' s  c a r e e r .  
He c o n t e n d s  t h a t  p e o p l e  compete f o r  v a c a n c i e s  i n  j o b s  w i t h  t h e  h i g h e s t  
r ewards ,  a  p r o c e s s  t h a t  h e  c a l l s  "vacancy c o m p e t i t i o n . ' '  
I n  Sorensen's  model p e o p l e  e n t e r i n g  t h e  l a b o r  m a r k e t  a r e  d i s t r i b u t e d  
randomly  among j o b s  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e i r  l e v e l  o f  r e s o u r c e s .  He assumes t h a t  
r e w a r d s  o f  t h e  f i r s t  j o b  a r e  p o s i t i v e l y  c o r r e l a t e d  w i t h  a  pe rson ' s  
r e s o u r c e s ,  b u t  l o w e r  t h a n  e ~ p e c t e d . ~  Over t i m e  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  t o  change j o b s  
o c c u r .  S i n c e  employment  i s  i n f l e x i b l e ,  w o r k e r s  w a i t  f o r  an o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  
move t o  a  b e t t e r  j ob .  T h i s  means t h a t :  
Under vacancy  c o m p e t i t i o n ,  t h e  r a t e  o f  a  downward s h i f t  i s  
v i r t u a l  1 y  z e r o .  
How r a p i d l y  i n d i v i d u a l s  move t o  b e t t e r  j o b s  depends on t h e  r a t e  a t  
w h i c h  v a c a n c i e s  i n  b e t t e r  j o b s  o c c u r ,  wh i ch  i n  t u r n  depends on t h e  r e u a r d s  
o f  t h e i r  c u r r e n t  j o b s ,  t h e i r  f i x e d  r e s o u r c e s ,  and t h e  o v e r a l l  r a t e  a t  w h i c h  
v a c a n c i e s  i n  t h e  s y s t e m  a r e  g e n e r a t e d .  Sorensen shows t h a t  h i s  assurnn t io r i s  
i m p l y  t h a t  as  work e x p e r i e n c e   increase^,'^ j o b  r e w a r d s  r i s e  on ave rage  and 
t h e  r a t e  o f  m o b i l  i t y  ' f a 1  1s.  The d e c l i n e  i n  t h e  r a t e  o f  m o b i l  i t y  w i t h  
i n c r e a s i n g  work e x p e r i e n c e  r e f l e c t s  a  d e c r e a s i n g  gap be tween a c t u a l  and 
e x p e c t e d  rewards ,  and an  i n c r e a s e  i n  p e r s o n a l  r e s o u r c e s ,  as  p o s i t e d  by  
human c a p i t a l  t h e o r y .  I n  s h o r t ,  i t  i s  a  s p u r i o u s  e f f e c t .  T h i s  i m p l i c a t i o n  
can be  summar ized as  f o l l o w s :  
Under vacancy  c o m p e t i t i o n ,  work e x p e r i e n c e  h a s  no e f f e c t  on  
t h e  r a t e  o f  a  j o b  s h i f t  when f i x e d  r e s o u r c e s  and c u r r e n t  
j o b  r e w a r d s  a r e  c o n t r o l l e d .  
I n  c o n t r a s t ,  p e r s o n a l  r e s o u r c e s  and c u r r e n t  j o b  r e w a r d s  have g e n u i n e  
( n o n s p u r i o u s l  i n f l u e n c e s  on t h e  r a t e  o f  s h i f t s  t o  b e t t e r  j o b s :  
Under vacancy  c o m p e t i t i o n ,  t h e  r a t e  o f  an upward  s h i f t  
r i s e s  w i t h  f i x e d  r e s o u r c e s  and d e c l i n e s  w i t h  c u r r e n t  j o b  
rewards .  
Note  t h a t  t h e  p a t t e r n  o f  e f f e c t s  o f  r e w a r d s  and r e s o u r c e s  on  t h e  r a t e  
o f  an  upward  s h i f t  i s  t h e  same unde r  vacancy  c o m p e t i t i o n  as  unde r  i m p e r f e c t  
c o m p e t i t i o n ,  e x c e p t  f o r  t h e  e f f e c t  o f  work e x p e r i e n c e .  The two t h e o r i e s  
d i f f e r  p r i m a r i l y  i n  t h e i r  i m p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  t h e  r a t e  o f  a  downward s h i f t .  
A c c o r d i n g  t o  i m p e r f e c t  c o m p e t i t i o n ,  t h i s  r a t e  e q u a l s  ( a t  l e a s t  r o u g h l y )  t h e  
r a t e  o f  an  upward  s h i f t ;  a c c o r d i n g  t o  vacancy  c o m p e t i t i o n ,  i t  i s  
n e g l i g i b l e .  
The a s s u m p t i o n s  o f  j o b  and vacancy c o m p e t i t i o n  have  o n l y  i n d i r e c t  
i m p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  t h e  r a t e  o f  l e a v i n g  a  j o b .  S i n c e  b o t h  a rguments  i m p l y  
t h a t  t h e  r a t e  o f  a  downward s h i f t  i s  much s m a l l e r  t h a n  t h e  r a t e  o f  an  
upward s h i f t ,  bo th  imply  t h a t  the r a t e  o f  leav ing  a  job i s  p r i m a r i l y  
determined by the  r a t e  o f  an upward s h i f t .  Th is  suggests the hypo thes is  
t h a t :  
Under job and vacancy c o ~ n p e t i t i o n ,  e f f e c t s  o f  rewards, 
resources and exper ience on the r a t e  o f  leav ing  a  job are 
the same as t h e i r  e f f e c t s  on t he  r a t e  o f  an upward s h i f t .  
3. When i s  Employment F l e x i b l e / I n f l e x i b l e ?  
Host proponents o f  marg ina l  p r o d u c t i v i t y  theory  (and ex tens ions  o f  i t ,  
such as human c a p i t a l  theory )  assume t h a t  t h i s  theory a p p l i e s  equa l l y  we l l  
t o  a l l  people and a l l  jobs i n  the  Un i t ed  S ta tes .  On the o the r  hand, the  
l i t e r a t u r e  on dual and segmented labor  markets c l a ims  t h a t  t he  process o f  
l abo r  a l l o c a t i o n  and reward d i s t r i b u t i o n  v a r i e s  w i t h i n  the  Un i t ed  S ta tes .  
A f u l l  exp lana t i on  o f  why one s e t  o f  assumptions a p p l i e s  t o  some jobs bu t  
n o t  o t h e r s  i s  beyond the scope o f  t h i s  paper.  I t  cou ld  a l s o  n o t  be t e s t e d  
w i t h  t he  a v a i l a b l e  da ta  (descr ibed  i n  Sec t ion  1111, which p rov ide  f a i r l y  
ex tens ive  i n f o r m a t i o n  on a t t r i b u t e s  o f  persons bu t  on l y  rud imentary  
i n f o r m a t i o n  on t h e i r  jobs. Consequently, I concent ra te  on those s i t u a t i o n s  
i d e n t i f i a b l e  w i t h  a v a i l a b l e  da ta  f o r  which one s e t  o f  assumptions r a t h e r  
than the o the r  seems l i k e l y  t o  app ly .  
I contend t h a t  c o n d i t i o n s  o f  employment tend t o  be f l e x i b l e  i n  smal l  
f i r m s  and i n f l e x i b l e  i n  l a r g e  f i rms ,  and consequent ly t h a t  p a t t e r n s  o f  job 
s h i f t s  i n  smal l  f i r m s  resemble those p r e d i c t e d  by impe r fec t  compet i t i on ,  
wh i l e  p a t t e r n s  o f  job s h i f t s  i n  l a r g e  f i r m s  resemble those p r e d i c t e d  by job 
o r  vacancy compet i t i on .  
The r e a s o n s  g i v e n  b y  Thurow (1975 )  and by  So rensen  and  K a l l e b e r g  ( 1981 )  
f o r  t h e  deve lopmen t  o f  i n f l e x i b l e  emp loyment  s u g g e s t  t h a t  i t  o c c u r s  
p r i m a r i l y  i n  l a r g e  f i r m s  wi th  a  comp lex  d i v i s i o n  o f  l a b o r .  I n  s u c h  f i r m s ,  
p r o d u c t i o n  o f t e n  depends  on  t h e  smooth  and  s y n c h r o n o u s  mesh ing  o f  many 
p e o p l e ' s  s k i l l s ,  p e r s o n a l i t i e s  and a c t i o n s .  These i n t e r d e p e n d e n c i e s  make 
i t  c o s t l y  t o  s u p e r v i s e  and d i f f i c u l t  t o  e v a l u a t e  any  one p e r s o n ' s  
c o n t r i b u t i o n  t o  t h e  f i r m ' s  p r o d u c t .  They a l s o  i n c r e a s e  t h e  chance  t h a t  
s u c c e s s f u l  work  p e r f o r m a n c e  r e q u i r e s  know ledge  s p e c i f i c  t o  t h e  work  
s e t t i n g .  
When s u p e r v i s i o n  and e v a l u a t i o n  o f  an  i n d i v i d u a l ' s  work  a r e  d i f f i c u l t ,  
e m p l o y e r s  o f t e n  f i n d  i t  u s e f u l  t o  d e v e l o p  j o b  l a d d e r s  -- j o b s  w i t h  
i n c r e a s i n g  r e w a r d s  l i n k e d  b y  a  p r o m o t i o n  s c h e d u l e  -- t o  m o t i v a t e  w o r k e r s  t o  
p e r f o r m  a t  t h e i r  c a p a c i t y .  When a  f i r m  h a s  j o b  l a d d e r s ,  a d j u s t i n g  one 
pe r son ' s  wages w i t h i n  a  j o b  because  o f  e x c e p t i o n a l  p e r f o r m a n c e  (assuming  
e x c e p t i o n a l  p e r f o r m a n c e  c a n  b e  i d e n t i f i e d )  u n d e r m i n e s  t h e  s y s t e m  o f  
i n c e n t i v e s  p r o v i d e d  b y  t h e s e  j o b  l a d d e r s .  I n  c o n t r a s t ,  p r o m o t i n g  a  h i g h  
p e r f o r m e r  n o t  o n l y  r e w a r d s  t h e  p e r s o n  b u t  a l s o  h e l p s  t o  i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e  
and l e g i t i m a t e  a  s y s t e m  o f  i n c e n t i v e s  f o u n d e d  on j o b  l a d d e r s .  I n  t h i s  
f a s h i o n  wages become l i n k e d  t o  j o b s  r a t h e r  t h a n  t o  i n d i v i d u a l  p r o d u c t i v i t y .  
Wage r i g i d i t y  i s  o n l y  one a s p e c t  o f  emp loyment  i n f l e x i b i l i t y .  The 
o t h e r  i s  c o n t r o l  o v e r  t h e  t e r m i n a t i o n  o f  a  j o b .  T h u r o u  (1975,  pp. 81-84)  
a r g u e s  t h a t  e m p l o y e r s  r e l i n q u i s h  c o n t r o l  o v e r  t h e  t e r m i n a t i o n  o f  employment  
s o  t h a t  c o w o r k e r s  w i l l  a s s e n t  t o  t r a i n i n g  and s h a r i n g  s p e c i f i c  know ledge  
w i t h  one a n o t h e r .  F i r m - s p e c i f i c  know ledge  seems l i k e l y  t o  i n c r e a s e  wi th  a  
f i r m ' s  s i z e ,  o t h e r  t h i n g s  b e i n g  e q u a l .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  medium and  l a r g e  f i r m s  
a r e  much more l i k e l y  t h a n  s m a l l  ones t o  be t h e  t a r g e t  o f  u n i o n i z a t i o n ,  
wh ich  has t r a d i t i o n a l l y  l i m i t e d  t h e  employer 's  a b i l i t y  t o  t e r m i n a t e  any 
p a r t i c u l a r  j ob -pe rson  match,  excep t  d u r i n g  a  b r i e f  p r o b a t i o n a r y  p e r i o d  o r  
f o r  c a r e f u l l y  c i r c u m s c r i b e d  c a u s e s . I 1  
An employer 's  a b i l i t y  t o  r e t a i n  c o n t r o l  ove r  t h e  c o n d i t i o n s  o f  
employment f o r  a  s i n g l e  j ob -pe rson  match seems much g r e a t e r  i n  s m a l l  f i r m s  
t h a n  i n  l a r g e  ones. F i r s t ,  w i t h  few employees t o  t r a i n  and s u p e r v i s e ,  an 
ownerlmanager may n o t  need t o  d e l e g a t e  these  t a s k s  t o  an employee's 
coworkers .  Fu r the rmore ,  b o t h  successes and m i s t a k e s  may be more v i s i b l e  
and more e a s i l y  t agged  t o  one p e r s o n  i n  a  s m a l l  f i r m  t h a n  i n  a  l a r g e  one. '=  
I n  a d d i t i o n ,  a  s m a l l  f i r m  may s i m p l y  n o t  have enough j o b s  t o  c r e a t e  j o b  
l a d d e r s  t o  m o t i v a t e  employees' per fo rmances,  even i f  t h e  employer s h o u l d  
want t o  use t h i s  sys tem o f  i n c e n t i v e s .  Consequent ly ,  an employer i n  a  
s m a l l  f i r m  seems more l i k e l y  t o  r e l y  on immedia te  rewards  l i k e  r a i s e s  and 
bonuses. F i n a l l y ,  i n  a  s m a l l  f i r m  v e r y  few p e o p l e  a r e  l i k e l y  t o  have 
s i m i l a r  j o b  t i t l e s ,  i n  wh ich  case one person's wages may be a d j u s t e d  t o  
match p r o d u c t i v i t y  w i t h o u t  o t h e r  employees f e e l i n g  t h a t  t h e i r  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  
o r  w o r t h  have been downgraded. 
U n f o r t u n a t e l y ,  t h e  a v a i l a b l e  d a t a  l a c k  i n f o r m a t i o n  on f i r m  s i z e .  They 
do r e c o r d ,  however, whether  a  j ob  s h i f t  i n v o l v e s  a  change o f  employer .  
Because a  s m a l l  f i r m  has  few j o b s  t h a t  can become vacan t ,  most  i n t r a f i r m  
s h i f t s  a r e  l i k e l y  t o  o c c u r  i n  l a r g e  f i r m s  and n o t  i n  s m a l l  ones. S h i f t s  
o r i g i n a t i n g  i n  s m a l l  f i r m s  a r e  l i k e l y  t o  be s h i f t s  t o  ano the r  f i r m .  Of 
course ,  some i n t e r f i r m  s h i f t s  o r i g i n a t e  i n  l a r g e  f i r m s ;  n e v e r t h e l e s s ,  f i r m  
s i z e  and t y p e  of  s h i f t  a r e  p r o b a b l y  a s s o c i a t e d . I 3  T h i s  supp lementary  
assumpt ion  l e a d s  t o  t h e  h y p o t h e s i s  t h a t :  
P a t t e r n s  o f  i n t r a f i r m  j o b  s h i f t s  r esemb le  t h o s e  p r e d i c t e d  
by  j o b  o r  vacancy  c o m p e t i t i o n ,  w h i l e  p a t t e r n s  o f  i n t e r f i r m  
s h i f t s  r e s e m b l e  t h o s e  p r e d i c t e d  b y  i m p e r f e c t  c o m p e t i t i o n .  
4. O t h e r  I s s u e s  
R e f l e c t i o n  on l a b o r  a l l o c a t i o n  by  e m p l o y e r s  h i r i n g  f r o m  w i t h i n  and  
w i t h o u t  t h e  f i r m  s u g g e s t s  s e v e r a l  s u b s i d i a r y  h y p o t h e s e s  w o r t h  e x a m i n i n g .  
When a  f i r m  h i r e s  an  o u t s i d e r ,  i t  mus t  r e l y  h e a v i l y  on  a  few e a s i l y  
o b s e r v e d  i n d i c a t o r s  o f  t r a i n a b i l i t y  and p r o d u c t i v i t y ,  i n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  l e v e l  
and k i n d  o f  s c h o o l i n g .  Such i n d i c a t o r s  may be s c r e e n i n g  d e v i c e s  (Spence,  
19741, b u t  p o o r  ones .  When a  f i r m  p r o m o t e s  an i n s i d e r ,  i t  c a n  n o t  o n l y  u s e  
e a s i l y  o b s e r v e d  i n d i c a t o r s  b u t  a l s o  a s s e s s  t h e  pe rson ' s  p e r f o r m a n c e  i n  a  
s i m i l a r  ( t h o u g h  p e r h a p s  l e s s  s k i l l e d )  j o b . ' #  I n  an  a n a l o g o u s  f a s h i o n ,  a  
p e r s o n  e v a l u a t i n g  j o b  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  mus t  r e l y  on  e a s i l y  o b s e r v e d  i n d i c a t o r s  
o f  j o b s  rewa rds ,  s u c h  a s  p r e s t i g e  and t h e  wage r a t e ,  more.when j o b s  a r e  i n  
d i f f e r e n t  f i r m s  t h a n  when t h e y  a r e  i n  t h e  same f i r m  a s  h i s  c u r r e n t  j o b .  
T h i s  r e a s o n i n g  s u g g e s t s  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  h y p o t h e s e s :  
( 1 )  The e f f e c t s  o f  e a s i l y  o b s e r v e d  i n d i c a t o r s  o f  j o b  
r e w a r d s  and p e r s o n a l  r e s o u r c e s  on  t h e  r a t e  o f  an u p u a r d  
s h i f t  a r e  s m a l l e r  f o r  i n t r a f i r m  s h i f t s  t h a n  f o r  i n t e r f i r m  
s h i f t s .  
( 2 )  The e f f e c t  o f  a b i l i t y  ( a  l e s s  e a s i l y  measured  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c )  o n  t h e  r a t e  o f  an u p u a r d  s h i f t  i s  l a r g e r  
f o r  i n t r a f i r m  s h i f t s  t h a n  f o r  i n t e r f i r m  s h i f t s .  
( 3 )  E a s i  1 y o b s e r v e d  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  p e r s o n s  and j o b s  
( e - g . ,  e d u c a t i o n ,  t h e  .wage r a t e ,  and  so  f o r t h )  e x p l a i n  
v a r i a t i o n  i n  t h e  r a t e  o f  upward  s h i f t s  o u t  o f  a  f i r m  b e t t e r  
t h a n  v a r i a t i o n  i n  t h e  r a t e  w i t h i n  a  f i r m .  
P a r e n t a l  a d v a n t a g e s  a r e  o f  t e n  r e g a r d e d  a s  a d d i  t i  o n a l  p e r s o n a l  
r e s o u r c e s .  As i s  w e l l  known (see ,  f o r  example,  B l a u  and Duncan, 19671, 
p a r e n t a l  advantages a r e  i m p o r t a n t  d e t e r m i n a n t s  o f  an i n d i v i d u a l ' s  
e d u c a t i o n a l  l e v e l  and measured menta l  a b i l i t y  as an a d u l t .  Ne t  o f  t h e i r  
e f f e c t  on such i n d i c a t o r s  o f  l a b o r  p r o d u c t i v i t y  as s c h o o l i n g  and menta l  
a b i l i t y ,  however, p a r e n t a l  advantages seem t o  i n c r e a s e  an i n d i v i d u a l ' s  
o p p o r t u n i t i e s  i n  t h e  l a b o r  m a r k e t  m a i n l y  t h r o u g h  t h e i r  impac t  on 
i n f o r m a t i o n  abou t  "good" j o h s  ( G r a n o v e t t e r ,  1 9 7 4 ) .  Since  such i n f o r m a t i o n  
i s  n o t  u s u a l l y  r e l e v a n t  f o r  i n t r a f i r m  job  s h i f t s ,  t h i s  s u g g e s t s  t h e  
f o l  l o w i n g  h y p o t h e s i s :  
When rewards  and o t h e r  p e r s o n a l  r e s o u r c e s  a r e  c o n t r o l l e d ,  
p a r e n t a l  advantages i n c r e a s e  t h e  r a t e  o f  upward i n t e r f i r m  
j o b  s h i f t s ,  decrease t h e  r a t e  o f  downward i n t e r f i r m  j o b s  
s h i f t s ,  and have no e f f e c t  on t h e  r a t e  o f  i n t r a f i r m  j o b  
s h i f t s .  
111. RESEARCH METHODS 
1. Data  
The hypotheses i n  S e c t i o n  I 1  a r e  t e s t e d  u s i n g  l i f e  h i s t o r i e s  c o l l e c t e d  
by James S. Coleman and P e t e r  H.  Ross i  t o  s t u d y  t h e  e d u c a t i o n a l ,  f a m i l i a l ,  
r e s i d e n t i a l  and work e x p e r i e n c e s  o f  U.S. men (see Blum e t  a l . ,  1 9 6 9 ) .  The 
u n i v e r s e  i s  t h e  t o t a l  p o p u l a t i o n  o f  30-39 y e a r - o l d  males  r e s i d i n g  i n  t h e  
U n i t e d  S t a t e s  i n  1968.  There were two samples:  a  n a t i o n a l  p r o b a b i l i t y  
sample and a  supp lementary  sample o f  b l a c k s .  I n t e r v i e w s  u e r e  conduc ted  i n  
January  o f  1969  and comp le ted  f o r  a  t o t a l  o f  1589 men ( 8 2 2  u h i t e s ,  7 3 8  
b l a c k s ,  and 2 9  o t h e r s ) .  The r a t e  o f  i n t e r v i e w  c o m p l e t i o n  was 7 6 . 1 %  f o r  t h e  
n a t i o n a l  sample and 78 .2% f o r  t h e  supp lementary  sample. R e s u l t s  r e p o r t e d  
below a r e  based on a n a l y s e s  o f  t h e  d a t a  on w h i t e  men o n l y .  
Because t h e  arguments d i s c u s s e d  e a r l i e r  p e r t a i n  t o  s h i f t s  f r om jobs  i n  
wh ich  a  p e r s o n  works as an uncoerced wage- laborer ,  I e x c l u d e d  d a t a  on 
p e r i o d s  o f  se l f -emp loymen t  and m i l i t a r y  s e r v i c e . ' =  I a l s o  e l i m i n a t e d  d a t a  
on j obs  i n  a g r i c u l t u r e  because t h e  wage r a t e  and p r e s t i g e  o f  a g r i c u l t u r a l  
and n o n a g r i c u l t u r a l  j o b s  a r e  p r o b a b l y  incom~nensura te .  Thus, I a n a l y z e d  
o n l y  d a t a  on s h i f t s  f r om f u l l - t i m e  j obs  i n  t h e  c i v i l i a n  n o n a g r i c u l t u r a l  
l a b o r  f o r c e  (CNALF). I d i d  n o t  i n c l u d e  j obs  e n t e r e d  p r i o r  t o  schoo l  
c o m p l e t i o n  because such j o b s  may be l e f t  f o r  reasons  q u i t e  u n r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  
i s s u e s  c o n s i d e r e d  i n  t h i s  pape r .  
Data prob lems n e c e s s i t a t e d  e x c l u s i o n  o f  d a t a  on some o f  responden ts '  
f u l l - t i m e  j o b s  i n  t h e  CNALF. I dropped d a t a  when i n f o r m a t i o n  was m i s s i n g  
on v a r i a b l e s  (see Tab le  1)  needed t o  e s t i m a t e  t h e  mode ls  c o n s i d e r e d  i n  t h i s  
paper .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  I o m i t t e d  192 j o b s  "nested" w i t h i n  a n o t h e r  job,  t h a t  
i s ,  ones t h a t  b e g i n  a f t e r ,  b u t  end b e f o r e ,  some o t h e r  j ob .  Us ing  these  
s e l e c t i o n  c r i t e r i a ,  I r e t a i n e d  f o r  a n a l y s i s  d a t a  on 3,484 j o b s  o f  713 w h i t e  
men. 
[ T a b l e  1 about  h e r e l  
The b a s i c  e x p l a n a t o r y  v a r i a b l e s  d i s c u s s e d  i n  S e c t i o n  I 1  a re  j ob  rewards  
and p e r s o n a l  r e s o u r c e s .  Tab le  1  g i v e s  d e f i n i t i o n s  and s i m p l e  d e s c r i p t i v e  
s t a t i s t i c s  f o r  t h e  measures o f  rewards  and r e s o u r c e s  used i n  t h e  a n a l y s e s .  
One measure o f  j ob  rewards  i s  t h e  wage r a t e  ( i n  d o l l a r s  p e r  h o u r ) .  
T h i s  i s ,  o f  course ,  t h e  i n d i c a t o r  p r e f e r r e d  by economis ts .  Ano the r  aspec t  
o f  a  job's rewards  i s  i t s  o c c u p a t i o n a l  p r e s t i g e ,  wh ich  i s  measured h e r e  by 
s iege1  's (1970) s c o r e .  P r e s t i g e  r e f  1 e c t s  many nonpecun ia ry  v a l u e s  
a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  an o c c u p a t i o n ,  as w e l l  as i t s  monetary  v a l u e  ( G o l d t h o r p e  
and Hope, 1972). Not  s u r p r i s i n g l y ,  t h e  wage r a t e  and p r e s t i g e  o f  
respondents '  j o b s  a r e  m o d e r a t e l y  c o r r e l a t e d  ( . 3 9 5 ) .  
The p r i m a r y  measures o f  p e r s o n a l  r e s o u r c e s  a r e  e d u c a t i o n  ( y e a r s  o f  
comple ted s c h o o l i n g ) ,  a  s c o r e  on a  10 - i t em t e s t  o f  v e r b a l  a b i l i t y ,  and 
f a t h e r ' s  e d u c a t i o n  ( y e a r s  o f  comple ted s c h o o l i n g ) .  The c o r r e l a t i o n  between 
(own) e d u c a t i o n a n d  v e r b a l  a b i l i t y  i s  .634. The c o r r e l a t i o n  between 
f a t h e r ' s  e d u c a t i o n  and these  o t h e r  measures o f  p e r s o n a l  r e s o u r c e s  a r e  
c o n s i d e r a b l y  s m a l l e r ,  though s t i l l  s u b s t a n t i a l .  Fa the r ' s  e d u c a t i o n  and t h e  
respondent 's  e d u c a t i o n  a r e  c o r r e l a t e d  .388, w h i l e  f a t h e r ' s  e d u c a t i o n  and 
t h e  respondent 's  v e r b a l  a b i l i t y  a r e  c o r r e l a t e d  .324.  
Time ( i n  y e a r s )  s i n c e  schoo l  c o m p l e t i o n  i s  a l s o  i n c l u d e d  i n  Tab le  1  and 
i n  some u n r e p o r t e d  a n a l y s e s .  Economis ts  o f t e n  c a l l  t h i s  v a r i a b l e  " l a b o r  
f o r c e  expe r ience"  under  t h e  assumpt ion  t h a t  i t  measures g e n e r a l  s k i l l s  
a c q u i r e d  t h r o u g h  work ing  (see, f o r  example, M ince r ,  1974). But  t h i s  
v a r i a b l e  measures a c q u i r e d  work e x p e r i e n c e  i m p e r f e c t l y  because i t  i n c l u d e s  
t i m e  o u t  o f  work s i n c e  schoo l  c o m p l e t i o n .  Time i n  j o b s  ( s i n c e  schoo l  
c o m p l e t i o n ) ,  wh ich  seems t o  be a  b e t t e r  measure o f  a  person's a c q u i r e d  
r e s o u r c e s  t h a n  t o t a l  t i m e  s i n c e  schoo l  c o m p l e t i o n  ( o r  t o t a l  t i m e  s i n c e  
l a b o r  f o r c e  e n t r y ) ,  i s  a l s o  i n c l u d e d  i n  Tab le  1  and i n  some o f  t h e  a n a l y s e s  
I per formed.  Below I r e p o r t  r e s u l t s  s o l e l y  f o r  t h i s  measure o f  e x p e r i e n c e ;  
however, f i n d i n g s  a r e  q u i t e  comparable when ( t o t a l )  t i m e  s i n c e  schoo l  
c o m p l e t i o n  i s  used i n s t e a d .  
One u n r e s o l v e d  c o m p l i c a t i o n  a r i s e s  because age and t i m e  i n  j o b s  have a  
v e r y  h i g h  p o s i t i v e  c o r r e l a t i o n  ( .822) .16  S t i l l  a n o t h e r  a r i s e s  because t h e  
sample d e s i g n  f o r c e s  a  h i g h  p o s i t i v e  c o r r e l a t i o n  between t h e  h i s t o r i c a l  
p e r i o d  and t i m e  i n  j o b s  ( . 713 ) . "  Because o f  t h i s  h i g h  c o l l i n e a r i t y ,  age 
and h i s t o r i c a l  p e r i o d  a r e  n o t  i n c l u d e d  i n  t h e  a n a l y s e s  r e p o r t e d  be low.  As 
a  r e s u l t ,  t h e  e f f e c t  o f  t i m e  i n  j o b s  on j o b - s h i f t  r a t e s  u n d o u b t e d l y  
r e f l e c t s  t h e  e f f e c t s  o f  age and h i s t o r i c a l  p e r i o d  i n  p a r t ,  and t h e r e f o r e  
must  be i n t e r p r e t e d  w i t h  c a u t i o n .  
As i n d i c a t e d  i n  t h e  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  e s t i m a t i o n  below, t h e  ma in  
"dependentJJ v a r i a b l e s  a r e  t h e  t i m e  o f  j o b  e x i t  and t h e  k i n d  o f  j o b  s h i f t  
t h a t  o c c u r s .  The t i m e  o f  j o b  e x i t  i s  n o t  known f o r  j o b s  h e l d  by 
responden ts  a t  t h e  i n t e r v i e u  (16.7% o f  a1 1 j ob-person matches a n a l y z e d ) ,  
b u t  t h e  method o f  e s t i m a t i o n  s t i l l  a l l o w s  i n f o r m a t i o n  on these  matches t o  
be used i n  t h e  a n a l y s i s ;  see S e c t i o n  3  b e l o u .  
Some hypo theses  men t ioned  i n  S e c t i o n  I 1  p e r t a i n  t o  t h e  k i n d  o f  j o b  
s h i f t  t h a t  occu rs ,  i n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  whether  t h e  r e u a r d s  i n  t h e  j o b  e n t e r e d  
a r e  g r e a t e r ,  t h e  same, o r  l e s s  t h a n  t h e  rewards  i n  t h e  j ob  l e f t .  T a b l e  1  
a l s o  d e f i n e s  t h e  v a r i a b l e  used t o  d e s c r i b e  t h e  change i n  r e u a r d s .  Note  
t h a t  changes i n  b o t h  o c c u p a t i o n a l  p r e s t i g e  and t h e  wage r a t e  a r e  
d i s t i n g u i s h e d ,  and t h a t  t h e  "same" reward  i s  t r e a t e d  as a  change l e s s  t h a n  
5%. R e p o r t i n g  e r r o r  makes i t  d i f f i c u l t  t o  be c o n f i d e n t  t h a t  a  v e r y  s m a l l  
change i s  r e a l l y  a  g a i n  o r  a  l o s s .  The c h o i c e  o f  5% i s  a r b i t r a r y ;  
n a t u r a l l y  r e s u l t s  wou ld  be somewhat d i f f e r e n t  f o r  a n o t h e r  c h o i c e . ' 8  
As I ment ioned  e a r l i e r ,  t h e  d a t a  l a c k  i n f o r m a t i o n  on f i r m  s i z e ,  b u t  do 
i n d i c a t e  whether a  j ob  s h i f t  i n v o l v e s  a  change o f  employers .  I n  some 
e m p i r i c a l  ana l yses ,  I d i s t i n g u i s h  between i n t r a -  and i n t e r f i r m  s h i f t s ,  
assuming t h a t  t h e  fo rmer  o r i g i n a t e  i n  l a r g e  f i r m s  and t h a t  most  o f  t h e  
l a t t e r  o r i g i n a t e  i n  s m a l l  f i r m s .  I t  s h o u l d  be k e p t  i n  mind,  however, t h a t  
some i n t e r f i r m  s h i f t s  o r i g i n a t e  i n  l a r g e  f i r m s ,  wh ich  weakens t e s t i n g  o f  
t h e  hypo theses .  T h i s  means t h a t  a  compar ison o f  p a t t e r n s  o f  i n t r a -  and 
i n t e r f i r m  s h i f t s  p r o v i d e s  a  c o n s e r v a t i v e  t e s t  o f  t h e  hypo theses  d i s c u s s e d  
i n  S e c t i o n  11 .  
2. Model i n s  Job-Shi  f  t P a t t e r n s  
As ment ioned i n  t h e  i n t r o d u c t i o n ,  D o e r i n g e r  and P i o r e  (1971) f o c u s  on 
" s t a b i l i t y  o f  employment." K e r r  (1954) i s  concerned w i t h  " b a r r i e r s  t o  
mobi 1 i t y  . I *  Sp i  le rman (1977) emphasizes " c a r e e r  l i n e s t *  -- t h e  r e 1  a t i v e  
f requency  o f  h o l d i n g  d i f f e r e n t  k i n d s  o f  j o b s  i n  a  c e r t a i n  o r d e r .  A l l  o f  
t hese  a r e  i m p o r t a n t  a s p e c t s  o f  j o b - s h i f t  p a t t e r n s ,  and mode ls  o f  j o b  s h i f t s  
s h o u l d  have i m p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  each a s p e c t .  
Con t i nuous - t ime  s t o c h a s t i c  models o f  change i n  c a t e g o r i c a l  v a r i a b l e s  
have i m p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  a l l  o f  t h e  above a s p e c t s  o f  j o b - s h i f t  p a t t e r n s .  Such 
mode ls  can be d e f i n e d  i n  t e rms  o f  assumpt ions  abou t  t h r e e  random v a r i a b l e s  
r e l e v a n t  t o  j o b - s h i f t   pattern^:'^ N ( t ) ,  t h e  number o f  j o b s  e v e r  h e l d  a t  
t i m e  t; Yn, a  c a t e g o r i c a l  v a r i a b l e  d e n o t i n g  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  t h e  n t h  job ;  
and T, t h e  t i m e  o f  e n t e r i n g  t h e  n t h  j ob .  
One r e l e v a n t  c o n c e p t  i s  t h e  s u r v i v o r  f u n c t i o n  f o r  t h e  (n -11 th  job ,  
j = Y , - ~ ,  u h i c h  g i v e s  t h e  p r o b a b i  1 i t y  t h a t  a  p e r s o n  s t i  I 1  " s u r v i v e s "  i n  
t h i s  j o b  a t  some t i m e  t :  
f o r  any p o s i t i v e  n, where t o  and yo a r e  t h e  s t a r t i n g  t i m e  and s t a t e  o f  t h e  
p rocess ,  r e s p e c t i v e l y .  The s u r v i v o r  f u n c t i o n  e q u a l s  1  when t = t n -1  and 
t e n d s  t o  f a l l  t o w a r d s  z e r o  a s  t - t n -1  i n c r e a s e s .  I t  i s  z e r o  f o r  t < tn.l. 
The above d e f i n i t i o n  o f  a  s u r v i v o r  f u n c t i o n  i m p l i c i t l y  assumes t h a t  t h e  
t i m e  o f  l e a v i n g  t h e  ( n - 1 1 t h  j o b  depends o n l y  on a t t r i b u t e s  o f  t h i s  j ob ,  
yn-1 ,  and t h e  t i m e  i t  was e n t e r e d ,  tn -1 .  T h i s  assump t i on ,  w h i c h  i s  a  f o r m  
o f  Markov assump t i on ,  i s  n o t  i n t r i n s i c a l  1  y  n e c e s s a r y .  ~ o u e v ' e r ,  i t  
s i m p l i f i e s  a n a l y s e s  and s e r v e s  a s  a  u s e f u l  b a s e l i n e - .  
The e x i t  r a t e ,  t h e  i n s t a n t a n e o u s  r a t e  o f  l e a v i n g  t h e  ( n - 1 1 t h  j ob ,  w h i c h  
has  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  j = Yn-1, i s  d e f i n e d  as :  
h j ( t l t n - 1 )  = l i m  ~ ! ( t I t , - , )  - G j ( t + ~ t ! t ~ - q )  ( 2  
A t 4 0  ' ~ j ( t l t ~ - ~ )  A t  
The n u m e r a t o r  i n  ( 2 )  c a n n o t  be n e g a t i v e  because ~ j ( t l t ~ - ~ )  c a n n o t  i n c r e a s e  
a s  t i n c r e a s e s .  B o t h  t e r m s  o f  t h e  denomina to r  a r e  a l s o  n o n n e g a t i v e ;  
c o n s e q u e n t l y ,  an  e x i t  r a t e  must  be  n o n n e g a t i v e .  I n  t h e o r y  i t  can t a k e  any 
p o s i t i v e  v a l u e ,  b u t  I assume t h a t  i t  i s  a l w a y s  f i n i t e .  A l a r g e  e x i t  r a t e  
i n  a  j o b  j means t h a t  p e o p l e  l e a v e  t h i s  k i n d  o f  j o b  r a p i d l y .  
The c o n d i t i o n a l  p r o b a b i l  i t y  o f  moving f r o m  j o b  j = y n - 1  t o  j o b  k = y n  
a t  t i m e  t ,  g i v e n  T n - 1  = t n -1  and Tn = t i s  d e n o t e d  by  m j k c t l t n - 1 )  and i s  
d e f i n e d  a s :  
One c a n  p u t  t h s  e x i t  r a t e  and t h e  c o n d i t i o n a l  t r a n s i t i o n  p r o b a b i l i t y  
t o g e t h e r  t o  d e f i n e  t h e  r a t e  o f  s h i f t i n g  f r o m  one j o b  j t o  a n o t h e r  k :  
These m a t h e m a t i c a l  c o n c e p t s  p a r a l l e l  s u b s t a n t i v e  n o t i o n s  m e n t i o n e d  
e a r l i e r .  " S t a b i l i t y  o f  employmentI1 i n  a  j o b  o f  t y p e  j i m p l i e s  t h a t  t h e  
e x i t  r a t e ,  h j ( t ) t n - l ) ,  i s  s m a l l .  " B a r r i e r s  t o  m o b i l i t y "  between two k i n d s  
o f  j o b s  j and k  conno tes  t h a t  m j k ( t l  t n - 1 )  i s  v e r y  low,  wh i ch  imp1 i e s  t h a t  
t h e  r a t e  o f  a  s h i f t  f r o m  j t o  k ,  r j k ( t ( t n - l ) ,  i s  c o m p a r a t i v e l y  s m a l l .  
"Career  l i n e d t  can  a l s o  be d e s c r i b e d  i n  t e r m s  o f  t r a n s i t i o n  r a t e s ;  however,  
d e s c r i b i n g  them may r e q u i r e  t h a t  t h e s e  r a t e s  depend on  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  
p r e v i o u s  j obs .  T h i s  s u b s t a n t i v e  i s s u e  c a l l s  f o r  a t t e n t i o n  t o  t h e  
d e f i n i t i o n  o f  t h e  c a t e g o r i e s  t h a t  Y n  can  t a k e  ( i t s  s o - c a l l e d  s t a t e  space) ,  
b u t  t h e  m o d e l i n g  s t r a t e g y  r e m a i n s  t h e  same. F i n a l l y ,  t h e  r a t e  o f  upward 
(downward) m o b i l i t y  r e f e r s  t o  t h e  r a t e  o f  mov ing  f r o m  a  j o b  w i t h  some l e v e l  
o f  r e w a r d s  t o  a n o t h e r  whose rewards  a r e  h i g h e r  ( l o w e r ) ,  i . e . ,  r j k ( t  1 t , - l ) ,  
where t h e  r e w a r d s  o f  a  j o b  i n  c a t e g o r y  k  a r e  h i g h e r  ( l o w e r )  t h a n  t h o s e  o f  a  
j o b  i n  c a t e g o r y  j. 
3. Forms o f  Mode ls  E s t i m a t e 4  
The arguments  i n  S e c t i o n  I 1  sugges t  t h a t  t h e  r a t e  o f  s h i f t i n g  f r o m  a 
j o b  o f  t y p e  j t o  a  j o b  o f  t y p e  k  f o r  some i n d i v i d u a l  i may depend on 
a t t r i b u t e s  o f  i ( a t  t h e  s t a r t  o f  t h e  j o b ) ,  j and k,  b u t  does n o t  depend on 
t i m e : 2 0  
The v a r i o u s  e x p l a n a t i o n s  c o n s i d e r e d  i n  S e c t i o n  I 1  g e n e r a t e  d i f f e r e n t  
hypo theses  a b o u t  t h e  d i r e c t i o n  o f  e f f e c t s  o f  v a r i a b l e s  on j o b - s h i f t  r a t e s ,  
b u t  n o t  t h e  s p e c i f i c  f o r m  o f  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p .  I  c o n s i d e r  two fo rms .  I n  
Form A ( d i s c u s s e d  a t  some l e n g t h  i n  Tuma e t  a l . ,  19791,  I  assume t h a t  j ob -  
shift rates are log-linear functions of observed i ,  j and k. In Form B, I 
assume that a job-shift rate is the product of two terms, one identical to 
that in Form A, and the other a gamma-distributed random disturbance, ~ i j k ,  
uhose mean is I and uhose variance is G 2 j k . 2 1  Each form has four versions, 
which express the various hypotheses discussed in Section 11. Table 2 
lists the four versions of each form and gives each one a "model number'' 
that provides a short-hand designation for the particular assumptions 
specified in Table 2. Bslow I comment briefly on each form. 
[Table 2 about here1 
Form A. Models uith Form A imply that the completed duration in a job 
has an exponential distribution and that the mean completed duration in a 
job is the inverse of the rate of leaving the job. They also imply that 
the distribution o f  the number of job shifts in a given time interval has a 
compound Poisson distribution; however, in general its exact form cannot be 
written explicitly uithout knouing the joint distribution of the 
explanatory variables. Model IVA, which distinguishes anong the kinds of 
jobs entered, implies that the conditional probability of a transition from 
one kind of job to another has a logit distribution (i.e., is a log-linear 
function of the explanatory variables). Thus, it allows the probabilit-ies 
of various job sequences to be calculated. 
Form B. Most previously-proposed models of transition rates have 
-
depended either o n  observable characteristics of persons and jobs (see, for 
example, Coleman, 1964; Spilerman, 1972a; Tuma, 1976) or o n  unobservable 
characteristics (see, for example, Silcock, 1954; Blumen et al.. 1955; 
Spilerman. 1972bl. Rod2ls with Form B combine these features.fz Such 
models let one examine the effects of observed characteristics on 
transition rates without making the unrealistic assumption that one has 
specified ail determinants of each rate. Furthermore, the proportional 
2 
reduction in the variance, u i j k ,  that results from adding explanatory 
variables to a model provides an indicator of the fit of a model to the 
2 data. , (If the fit is perfect, U i j k  is zero.) 
The assumption that the random disturbance is gamma-distributed follows 
the suggestions of Silcock ( 1 9 5 4 )  and Spilerman (1972b1, neither of whom 
included observable variables in their models.23 A gamma distribution has 
the advantage that it can range over all positive values (as'can transition 
rates) and can assume a variety of shapes, from highly skeued to nearly 
normal. One can derive implications for the same kinds of quantities that 
I discussed above for Form A, but the results are more complicated. 
Selected implications are derived in the appendix. 
One well known implication of allowing unobservable heterogeneity in 
transition rates is that every transition rate declines with duration (the 
length of time since the last shift), even in a population with identical 
observable characteristics (see, for example, NcFarland,. 1970). A less 
uell known implication is that the population-level odds of entering one 
state (e.g., kind of job) rather than another depend on duration. 
One uould like to distinguish the effects of unobserved heterogeneity 
in a population from the true duration-dependence of transition rates. In 
principle, unobserved heterogeneity can be distinguished from genuine 
duration-dependence if one has.a priori knowledge of the functional form o f  
either the duration dependence or the unobserved heterogeneity. For 
example, unobse rved  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  p e r s o n s  o r  j o b s  t h a t  have  t h e  same 
e f f e c t  on  e v e r y  t r a n s i t i o n  r a t e  can be d e t e c t e d  by a l l o w i n g  t h e  random 
d i s t u r b a n c e s  ( t h e  € i j k f s )  t o  c o v a r y  f o r  t h e  s u c c e s s i v e  j o b s o f  p e r s o n  i and 
f o r  s u c c e s s i v e  o c c u p a n t s  c f  j o b  j. T h i s  s t r a t e g y ,  u h i c h  has  been used  v e r y  
s u c c e s s f u l l y  i n  l i n e a r  va r i ance -componen ts  models,  i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  
imp lemen t  i n  t h e  case  o f  mode ls  o f  t r a n s i t i o n  r a t e s  and h a s  n o t  been 
a t t e m p t e d  i n  t h i s  pape r .  Consequent ly ,  i n t e r p r e t i n g  e s t i m a t e s  o f  U i j k  f o r  
v a r i o u s  mode ls  i s  ambiguous: i t  may r e f l e c t  unobse rved  h e t e r o g e n e i t y ,  a s  
assumed i n  Form 8, o r  i t  may r e f l e c t  t ime-dependence i n  each i n d i v i d u a l ' s  
t r a n s i t i o n  r a t e s .  The d i s c u s s i o n  and p r e s e n t a t i o n  o f  r e s u l t s  i n  S e c t i o n  I V  
l a r g e l y  i g n o r e s  t h i s  a a b i g u i t y ,  b u t  r e a d e r s  s h o u l d  keep i t  i n  mind.  
.4. E s t i m a t i o n  
C o e f f i c i e n t s  o f  v a r i a b l e s  a r e  e s t i m a t e d  b y  t h e  method o f .max imum 
l i k e l i h o o d ,  w h i c h  g i v e s  a s y m p t o t i c a l l y  unb iased ,  m in imum-va r iance  
e s t i m a t o r s  u n d e r  v e r y  weak r e g u l a r i t y  c o n d i t i o n s  o n  a  p r o b a b i l i t y  
d i s t r i b u t i o n  f u n c t i o n  (Dhrymes, 1970). The g e n e r a l  f o r m  o f  t h e  l i k e l i h o o d  
when e v e n t - h i s t o r y  d a t a  a r e  a v a i l a b l e  f o r  an i ndependen t  random sample  o f  I 
i n d i v i d u a l s  i s  (see Tuma e t  a l . ,  1979):  
where i d e n o t e s  an i n d i v i d u a l ;  n  t h e  n u s b e r  o f  an event ;  j = yi,,-l t h e  
k i n d  o f  j o b  i n d i v i d u a l  i e n t e r e d  a t  t h e  (n -11 th  event ;  9 t h e  t o t a l  number 
n f  k i n d s  o f  j o b s  d i s t i n g u i s h e d ;  t i  ,,-I t h e  t i m e  i n d i v i d u a l  i e n t e r s  t h e .  n t h  
job;  u i ,  t h e  obse rved  d u r a t i o n  i n  t h e  n t h  job;  x i j k  a  v e c t o r  o f  obse rvod  
e x p l a n a t o r y  v a r i a b l e s  d e s c r i b i ~ g  i, j and k; w i n  a  dulnmy v a r i a b l e  t h a t  
e q u a l s  1 i f  i n d i v i d u a l  i ' s  n t h  e v e n t  i s  observed;  vin;c a  dummy v a r i a b l e  
t h a t  e q u a l s  1 i f  i n d i v i d u a l  i ' s  n t h  e v e n t  c o n s i s t s  o f  a  s h i f t  t o  k.  The 
fo rms o f  r i j k ( . )  and o f  t h e  s u r v i v o r  f u n c t i o n ,  Gj(.)n a r e  d e t e r m i n e d  by  t l i e  
model assumed t o  d e s c r i b e  t h e  p r o c e s s  o f  s h i f t i n g  j obs .  
The v a r i a b l e s  X i j k r  M i n r  v i n k ,  and t in  a r e  o b t a i n e d  f r o m  t h e  d a t e  a s  
d e s c r i b e d  i n  Tab1 e  1. X i  j k  s t a n d s  f o r  t h e  v a r i o u s  i n d i c a t o r s  o f  r e w a r d s  
and r e s o u r c e s  o f  i n d i v i d u a l  i i n  a  j o b  o f  t y p e  j. The v a r i a b l e  W i n  i s  
l a b e l l e d  "Job L e f t "  i n  T a b l e  1, u h i l e  v i n k  comes f r o m  t h e  v a r i a b l e  l a b e l l e d  
"Change i n  Rewards." The v a r i a b l e s  "Date Job Entered"  and "Las t  Da te  i n  
J o b " g i v e  t h e  i n f o r m a t i o n  on, r e s p e c t i v e l y ,  ti,,-, and t in  f o r  p e r s o n  i ' s  
n t h  j ob .  The obse rved  d u r a t i o n  i n  t h e  n t h  job,  ui,, i s  c a l c u l a t e d  as  t h e  
d i f f e r e n c e  between "Las t  Date  i n  Job" and "Date Job Entered". The 
l i k e l i h o o d  e q u a t i o n  i n  (61, w h i c h  i s  g e n e r a l ,  a l l o w s  t r a n s i t i o n  r a t e s  and 
s u r v i v o r  f u n c t i o n s  t o  depend on n. T a b l e  1 does n o t  m e n t i o n  n, t h e  number 
o f  t h e  e v e n t  ( i . e . ,  t h e  number o f  j o b s  h e l d )  because t h e  e x p l a n a t i o n s  
d i s c u s s e d  i n  S e c t i o n  I f  assume n  i s  i r r e l e v a n t  t o  t h e  j o b - s h i f t i n g  p r o c e s s .  
Maximum l i k e l i h o o d  (ML) e s t i m a t i o n  h a s  s e v e r a l  advantages.  I n  
p a r t i c u l a r ,  i t  l e t s  one use  censo red  o b s e r v a t i o n s  on  responden ts '  jobs ,  
i .e . ,  t h e i r  j o b s  a t  t h e  t i m e  o f  t h e  i n t e r v i e w ,  wh ich  have n o t  y e t  ended. 
D e l e t i n g  o b s e r v a t i o n s  on such j o b s  can  b i a s  e s t i m a t e s  o f  t r a n s i t i o n  r a t e s  
s e r i o u s l y  (Sorensen,  1977b; Tuma and-Hannan, 1978) because t h e  ave rage  
comp le ted  l e n g t h  i s  l o n g e r  f o r  censo red  j o b s  t h a n  f o r  j o b s  w i t h  an  obse rved  
t e r m i n a t i o n  d a t e  ( F e l l e r ,  1968). By i n c l u d i n g  a  p r o b a b i l i t i s t i c  s t a t e m e n t  
f o r  c e n s o r e d  o b s e r v a t i o n s ,  ML e s t i m a t i o n  u s u a l l y  p r o v i d e s  e s t i m a t o r s  w i t h  
d e s i r a b l e  p r o p e r t i e s ,  even when samples  a r e  o n l y  medium i n  s i z e  and t h e  
p r o p o r t i o n  o f  c e n s o r e d  o b s e r v a t i o n s  i s  h i g h .  I n  t h e  a n a l y s e s  r e p o r t e d  
be low,  t h e  number o f  j ob -pe rson  matches  i s  l a r g e  ( 3 4 8 4 )  and t h e  p r o p o r t i o n  
o f  c e n s o r e d  matches  i s  s m a l l  ( 0 . 1 6 7 ) .  Consequen t l y ,  c e n s o r i n g  p r o b a b l y  
makes a  n e g l i g i b l e  c o n t r i b u t i o n  t o  b i a s  i n  f i n d i n g s  r e p o r t e d  b e l o w .  
ML e s t i m a t i o n  a l s o  h a s  advan tages  i n  t e r m s  o f  t h e  k i n d s  o f  h y p o t h e s e s  
t e s t s  t h a t  i t  a l l o w s .  F i r s t ,  one can  t e s t  t h e  r e l a t i v e  f i t  o f  n e s t e d  
mode ls .  Suppose we have  a  model  Rl, such  a s  one o f  t h o s e  i n  T a b l e  2, and 
c o n s t r a i n  q p a r a m e t e r s  i n  i t  t o  t a k e  c e r t a i n  v a l u e s  ( p e r h a p s  t h a t  some 
members o f  t h e  v e c t o r  ajk a r e  z e r o  o r  t h a t  ajk does n o t  depend on j o r  k). 
C a l l  t h e  c o n s t r a i n e d  model Ro ( t h e  n u l l  h y p o t h e s i s ) .  The l i k e l i h o o d  r a t i o ,  
X, i s  d e f i n e d  a s  max (a l l /max (20 )  and  h a s  t h e  p r o p e r t y  t h a t  - 2 log, X i s  
a s y m p t o t i c a l l y  d i s t r i b u t e d  a s  x 2  w i t h  q d e g r e e s  o f  f r eedom unde r  t h e  n u l l  
h y p o t h e s i s .  The h y p o t h e s i s  e x p r e s s e d  by  t h e  c o n s t r a i n e d  model ,  no, i s  
r e j e c t e d  i f  t h e  o b s e r v e d  v a l u e  o f  - 2  log, X exceeds  t h e  c r i t i c a l  v a l u e  o f  
x Z  w i t h  q d e g r e e s  o f  f r eedom f o r  t h e  s e l e c t e d  s i g n i f i c a n c e  l e v e l .  
One c a n  a l s o  t e s t  whe the r  a  s i n g l e  v a r i a b l e  a f f e c t s  a  t r a n s i t i o n  r a t e .  
The i n v e r s e  o f  t h e  F i s h e r  i n f o r m a t i o n  m a t r i x  -- t h e  m a t r i x  o f  second 
p a r t i a l  d e r i v a t i v e s  o f  log, a w i t h  res 'pec t  t o  t h e  p a r a m e t e r s  i n  a  model -- 
p r o v i d e s  an  e s t i m a t e  o f  t h e  v a r i a n c e - c o v a r i a n c e  m a t r i x  o f  p a r a m e t e r s .  A 
p a r a m e t e r ' s  s t a n d a r d  e r r o r  i s  e s t i m a t e d  b y  t h e  s q u a r e  r o o t  o f  a  p a r a m e t e r ' s  
e s t i m a t e d  v a r i a n c e .  S i n c e  NL e s t i m a t o r s  a r e  a s y m p t o t i c a l l y  no rma l ,  one can  
t h e n  p e r f o r m  e i t h e r  F- o r  t - t e s t s  f o r  a  s i g n i f i c a n t  d i f f e r e n c e  be tween 
e s t i m a t e d  and h y p o t h e s i z e d  v a l u e s  o f  a  p a r a m e t e r .  
An i t e r a t i v e  p r o c e d u r e  m u s t  be  used  t o  f i n d  t h e  v a l u e s  o f  p a r a m e t e r s  
t h a t  m a x i m i z e  % i n  e q u a t i o n  (6) f o r  a l l  m o d e l s  i n  T a b l e  2 e x c e p t  I A  and 
I I I A .  ML e s t i m a t e s  can  be  w r i t t e n  e x p l i c i t l y  f o r  t h e s e .  F o r  Model I A ,  
a  (Mean o f  JOB LEFT) / ( l l ean  Obse rved  D u r a t i o n  i n  a  J o b ) ,  (7) 
and  f o r  Model I I I A ,  
U j k  = ( F r a c t i o n  o f  Moves f r o m  a  Job  o f  Type i t o  a Job  o f  T v ~ e  k ) .  ( 8 )  
(Mean Obse rved  D u r a t i o n  i n  a  J o b  o f  Type j) 
Suppose t h a t  j o b  s h i f t s  a r e  p a t t e r n l e s s ,  i m p l y i n g  t h a t  a j k  does  n o t  
depend on  j o r  k, i . e . ,  
I t  i s  i m p o r t a n t  t o  n o t e  t h a t  t h e  maximum o f  .L depends  on  '# even  i f  ( 9 )  i s  
t r u e  and t h e  t y p e  o f  j o b  e n t e r e d  i s  t o t a l l y  due t o  " luck* ' .  The maximum o f  
2 f o r  Model I A  e q u a l s  t h e  maximum o f  .L f o r  Model I I I A  m u l t i p l i e d  b y  '#. A  
l i k e l i h o o d  r a t i o  t e s t  o f  Model I I I A  a g a - i n s t  I A  mus t  a l l o w  f o r  t h i s  f a c t .  
I V .  RESULTS 
I n  s p i t e  o f  amp le  p r e v i o u s  e v i d e n c e  t h a t  emp loyment  s t a b i l i t y  depends  
o n  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  j o b s  and p e r s o n s  ( s e e  f o o t n o t e  31, i t  i s  u s e f u ' l  t o  
b e g i n  b y  d e m o n s t r a t i n g  t h i s .  T h i s  p r o c e d u r e  l e t s  one  b e g i n  w i t h  a  s i m p l e  
model  and  i n t r o d u c e  c o m p l e x i t y  g r a d u a l l y .  
T a b l e  3  r e p o r t s  e s t i m a t e s  f o r  s e v e r a l  m o d e l s  o f  t h e  r a t e  o f  l e a v i n g  a  
j ob ,  h e r e a f t e r  c a l l e d  t h e  e x i t  r a t e .  The m o d e l s  r e f e r e n c e d  i n  T a b l e  3  a r e  
a l i k e  i n  i g n o r i n g  t h e  ou tcome o f  a  j o b  s h i f t ,  b u t  d i f f e r  i n  o t h e r  r e s p e c t s .  
[ T a b l e  3  a b o u t  h e r e l  
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Model I A  assumes t h a t  t h e  e x i t  r a t e  i s  a  c o n s t a n t ,  a, w h i c h  a p p l i e s  t o  
a l l  j o b s  s h i f t s .  ( R e c a l l  t h a t  t h i s  model i s  s u g g e s t e d  by human c a p i t a l  
t h e o r y  unde r  t h e  a s s u m p t i o n s  o f  p e r f e c t  i n f o r m a t i o n ,  c o s t l e s s  s e a r c h ,  and 
random exogenous d i s e q u i l i b r a t i n g  e v e n t s . )  From ( 7 )  t h e  ML e s t i m a t e  o f  u 
i s  - 3 8 5  p e r  y e a r .  Under t h e  assump t i on  t h a t  t h e  e x i t  r a t e  i s  a  c o n s t a n t ,  
t h e  ave rage  c o m p l e t e d  d u r a t i o n  i n  a  j o b  i s  t h e  i n v e r s e  o f  t h e  e x i t  r a t e ,  o r  
2.60 y e a r s .  
Model I 0  assumes t h a t  t h e  e x i t  r a t e  h a s  a  gamma d i s t r i b u t i o n  w i t h i n  t h e  
p o p u l a t i o n  f r o m  w h i c h  t h e  sample  was drawn b u t  i s  a c o n s t a n t  f o r  any g i v e n  
j o b - p e r s o n  match.  T h i s  i s  e x a c t l y  t h e  model p r o p o s e d  by  S i l c o c k  (1954 ) .  
T a b l e  3  s a y s  t h a t  t h e  e s t i m a t e d  ave rage  e x i t  r a t e  i s  .595 p e r  y e a r ,  and  
t h a t  t h e  e s t i m a t e d  v a r i a n c e  i n  t h e  e x i t  r a t e  i s  .570.  S i l c o c k ' s  f o r m u l a  
(1954, p. 4351 i m p l i e s  t h a t  t h e  ave rage  c o m p l e t e d  d u r a t i o n  i n  a  j o b  i s  
1.595 - .595( .570)1"  = 3.41 y e a r s .  Thus, t h e  ave rage  d u r a t i o n  i n  a  j o b  i s  
h i g h e r  i n  Model I 0  t h a n  i n  IA ,  even  t hough  t h e  mean e x i t  r a t e  i s  h i g h e r  i n  
Model I 0  t h a n  i n  I A .  T h i s  o c c u r s  because Model I 0  p r e d i c t s  t h a t  some j o b -  
p e r s o n  ma tches  a r e  e x t r e m e l y  s t a b l e .  These v e r y  s t a b l e  ma tches  r a i s e  t h e  
ave rage  c o m p l e t e d  d u r a t i o n  more t h a n  enough t o  compensate f o r  t h e  i n c r e a s e  
i n  t h e  ave rage  e x i t  r a t e .  
Model I A  can  be  v i ewed  a s  h a v i n g  t h e  same f o r m  a s  Model I 0  e x c e p t  t h a t  
a  c o n s t r a i n t  h a s  been imposed, namely,  t h a t  t h e  v a r i a n c e  i n  t h e  e x i t  r a t e  
i s  i d e n t i c a l l y  z e r o .  Thus, a  l i k e l i h o o d  r a t i o  t e s t  compar ing  Mode ls  I A  and 
I B  i n d i c a t e s  whe the r  t h e  e x i t  r a t e  v a r i e s  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  w i t h i n  t h e  
p o p u l a t i o n  sampled. The v a l u e  o f  x Z  f o r  t h i s  t e s t ,  u h i c h  has  one deg ree  o f  
f reedom, i s  386.2, i m p l y i n g  t h a t  Model I A  can  be r e j e c t e d  a t  any r e a s o n a b l e  
l e v e l  o f  s i g n i f i c a n c e .  (The p r o b a b i l i t y  t h a t  x Z  w i t h  one degree o f  f reedom 
exceeds 10.8 i s  .001.1 
The h e t e r o g e n e i t y  i n  e x i t  r a t e s  t h a t  l e a d s  f lodel I A  t o  be r e j e c t e d  may 
a r i s e  f rom e f f e c t s  o f  a t t r i b u t e s  o f  j o b s  o r  pe rsons .  Model I I A  p e r m i t s  t h e  
e x i t  r a t e  t o  depend on p e r s o n a l  r e s o u r c e s ,  j o b  rewards  and t i m e  i n  j obs .  
The l i k e l i h o o d  r a t i o  t e s t  o f  Model I I A  v e r s u s  f lodel I A  i s  s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  
t h e  .001 l e v e l ,  and most  v a r i a b l e s  i n c l u d e d  i n  f lodel I I A  a f f e c t  t h e  e x i t  
r a t e  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  ( .  05 1 eve1 1 .  
Model I I B  has  t h e  same f o r m  a s  f lodel I I A  b u t  does n o t  c o n s t r a i n  t h e  
v a r i a n c e  i n  t h e  e x i t  r a t e  t o  be ze ro ,  as  I I A  does. The l i k e l i h o o d  r a t i o  
t e s t  o f  f lodel  I I B  v e r s u s  any o t h e r  model r e f e r e n c e d  i n  Tab le  3 (each o f  
wh ich  i s  n e s t e d  w i t h i n  I I B )  i s  s t a t i s t i c a l l y  s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  t h e  .001 l e v e l .  
B u t  i n  s p i t e  o f  t h e s e  i m p r e s s i v e l y  s m a l l  s i g n i f i c a n c e  l e v e l s ,  t h e  a d d i t i o n  
o f  t h e  s i x  v a r i a b l e s  has reduced  t h e  v a r i a n c e  i n  t h e  e x i t  r a t e  b y  o n l y  7.1 
p e r c e n t .  Thus, t h e  improvement i n  f i t  o b t a i n e d  by  a l l o w i n g  t h e  e x i t  r a t e  
t o  depend on rewards ,  r e s o u r c e s  and t i m e  i n  j o b s  i s  modest by cus tomary  
s t a n d a r d s .  Not  s u r p r i s i n g l y ,  t h e  o v e r a l l  p a t t e r n  o f  e f f e c t s  o f  t h e  
e x p l a n a t o r y  v a r i a b l e s  i s  e x t r e m e l y  s i m i l a r  t o  t h a t  f ound  f o r  f lodel  I I A .  
The e s t i m a t e s  f o r  b o t h  Mode ls  I I A  and I I B  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  t h e  e x i t  r a t e  
i s  s m a l l e r  f o r  j o b s  w i t h  g r e a t e r  p r e s t i g e  and h i g h e r  wages. T h i s  f i n d i n g  
ag rees  w i t h  t h e  i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  i m p e r f e c t  and vacancy c o m p e t i t i o n ,  b u t  n o t  
j o b  c o m p e t i t i o n .  Assuming t i m e  i n  j o b s  measures a c q u i r e d  r e s o u r c e s  ( r e c a l l  
i t s  c o r r e l a t i o n  w i t h  age and h i s t o r i c a l  p e r i o d ,  however) ,  i t s  e f f e c t  
i m p l i e s  t h a t  t h e  e x i t  r a t e  f a l l s  as  r e s o u r c e s  r i s e .  T h i s  r e s u l t  s u p p o r t s  
t h e  h y p o t h e s i s  p r e d i c t e d  by i m p e r f e c t  c o m p e t i t i o n ,  b u t  n o t  t h o s e  p r e d i c t e d  
by j o b  and vacancy c o m p e t i t i o n .  I n  c o n t r a s t ,  t h e  e f f e c t s  o f  f i x e d  
r e s o u r c e s  -- f a t h e r ' s  e d u c a t i o n  and a b i l i t y  -- have t h e  o p p o s i t e  s i g n :  t h e  
e x i t  r a t e  i n c r e a s e s  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  as these  r e s o u r c e s  i n c r e a s e .  These 
f i n d i n g s  f i t  t h e  p r e d i c t i o n s  o f  j o b  and vacancy c o m p e t i t i o n ,  b u t  n o t  
i m p e r f e c t  compet i  t i o n .  I n  sum, t h e  p a t t e r n  o f  e f f e c t s  o f  rewards,  f i x e d  
resou rces ,  and t i m e  i n  j o b s  on t h e  e x i t  r a t e  does n o t  e n t i r e l y  s u p p o r t  any 
o f  t h e  t h r e e  arguments o u t l i n e d  i n  S e c t i o n  11. 
These m ixed  r e s u l t s  a r e  n o t  s u r p r i s i n g  i f ,  as  I argued i n  S e c t i o n  11.3, 
employment i s  f l e x i b l e  i n  some j o b s  and i n f l e x i b l e  i n  o t h e r s .  A  b e t t e r  
t e s t  o f  t hese  arguments i s  o b t a i n e d  by d i s t i n g u i s h i n g  between j o b s  gove rned  
by f l e x i b l e  and i n f l e x i b l e  employment. R e c a l l  t h a t  I argued t h a t  i n  t h e  
U n i t e d  S t a t e s ,  i n t r a f i r m  j o b  s h i f t s  a r e  m a i n l y  s h i f t s  f r om j o b s  governed by 
i n f l e x i b l e  employment, w h i l e  i n t e r f i r m  s h i f t s  a r e  a  m i x t u r e  o f  s h i f t s  f r o m  
jobs  governed by f l e x i b l e  and i n f l e x i b l e  employment. I a l s o  p o i n t e d  o u t  
t h e  impor tance  o f  c o n s i d e r i n g  whether  t h e  change i n  rewards  accompanying a 
j o b  s h i f t  i s  p o s i t i v e ,  n e g a t i v e ,  o r  zero ;  t hese  d i s t i n c t i o n s  a r e  h e l p f u l  i n  
t e s t i n g  t h e  t h e o r i e s  o f  i m p e r f e c t ,  job  and vacancy c o m p e t i t i o n .  
For  t hese  reasons,  t h e  r e s t  o f  t h e  a n a l y s i s  c o n c e n t r a t e s  on i n t e r f i r m  
and i n t r a f i r m  job  s h i f t s .  I n  t hese  a n a l y s e s  I i g n o r e  t h e  r o u g h l y  9-10% o f  
s h i f t s  f r o m  a  j o b  w i t h i n  t h e  CNALF t o  a  j o b  o u t s i d e  t h e  CNALF (e.g. ,  t o  
m i l i t a r y  s e r v i c e  o r  t o  a g r i c u l t u r a . 1  j o b s )  because t h e  p r e s t i g e  and wages o f  
j obs  o u t s i d e  t h e  CNALF a r e  measured v e r y  p o o r l y .  I a l s o  f o c u s  o n l y  on 
s h i f t s  t o  j o b s  e n t e r e d  w i t h i n  s i x  months a f t e r  e x i t  f r o m  t h e  p r e v i o u s  
j o b . 2 4  Of a11 s h i f t s  f r o m  a  j o b  w i t h i n  t h e  CNALF t o  a n o t h e r  j ob  i n  t h e  
CNALF, 3.2% d i d  n o t  o c c u r  w i t h i n  t h i s  t i m e  i n t e r v a l .  
To s t u d y  e f f e c t s  o f  l a b o r - m a r k e t  s t r u c t u r e  on j o b  s h i f t s  w i t h  d i f f e r e n t  
reward  changes, one must f i r s t  s e l e c t  a  measure o f  t h e  change i n  rewa-ds .  
S i m p l i c i t y  makes i t  a p p e a l i n g  t o  f o c u s  on changes i n  e i t h e r  p r e s t i g e  gc 
wages. Given t h e  m o d e r a t e l y  h i g h  c o r r e l a t i o n  between a  job 's  wage r a t e  and 
i t s  p r e s t i g e  i n  t hese  d a t a  C.3951, t h i s  s t r a t e g y  m i g h t  sound s a t i s f a c t o r y  
because i t  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  p r e s t i g e  and wage changes a r e  also m o d e r a t e l y  
c o r r e l a t e d .  But  t h i s  i s  n o t  t h e  case. Based on an a b s o l u t e  s c a l e ,  changes 
i n  p r e s t i g e  and t h e  wage r a t e  a r e  c o r r e l a t e d  ..087; based on a  p e r c e n t a g e  
s c a l e ,  t h e y  a r e  c o r r e l a t e d  .035. 
Tab le  4 r e p o r t s  t h e  j o i n t  r e l a t i v e  f requency  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  p r e s t i g e  
and wage changes, where a  "gain"  means t h a t  t h e  j o b .  e n t e r e d  has  a  p r e s t i g e  
(wage) more t h a n  5% h i g h e r  t h a n  t h e  j ob  l e f t  and a  " l oss "  means t h a t  t h e  
job  e n t e r e d  has  a  p r e s t i g e  (wage) more t h a n  5% l ower  t h a n  t h e  j ob  l e f t .  
("Same" i s  a  r e s i d u a l  c a t e g o r y .  
[ T a b l e  4 abou t  h e r e 1  
Look f i r s t  a t  t h e  rows and columns l a b e l l e d  "Out." Each e n t r y  w i t h  
t h i s  head ing g i v e s  t h e  f r a c t i o n  o f  s h i f t s  w i t h i n  t h e  CNALF b u t  out o f  t h e  
f i r m  t h a t  a r e  o f  t h e  t y p e  i n d i c a t e d .  For  example, o f  t h e  s h i f t s  t o  a n o t h e r  
f i r m  w i t h i n  t h e  CNALF, 18.7% l e d  t o  b o t h  p r e s t i g e  and wage g a i n s ,  w h i l e .  
o n l y  12.2% l e d  t o  b o t h  p r e s t i g e  and wage l o s s e s .  Tab le  4 a l s o  g i v e s  t h e  
j o i n t  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  reward  changes f o r  s h i f t s  w i t h b  a  f i r m ,  wh ich  have 
t h e  head ing " In."  I f  each t y p e  o f  change i n  rewards  were e q u a l l y  l i k e l y ,  
e v e r y  e n t r y  would be 119 = .Ill. One would n o t  expec t  t h i s  va lue ,  g i v e n  
t h e  m a r g i n a l  d i s t r i b u t i o n s  f o r  p r e s t i g e  and wage changes, wh ich  f a v o r  a  
g a i n ,  e s p e c i a l l y  i n  t h e  wage r a t e . 2 5  
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I n  t e r m s  o f  t e s t i n g  my a rguments ,  t h e  more i m p o r t a n t  i s s u e  i s  t h e  
deg ree  o f  s i m i l a r i t y  b e t u e e n  t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  changes  i n  r e w a r d s  f o r  
s h i f t s  w i t h i n  and  o u t  o f  a  f i r m .  The h y p o t h e s i s  t h a t  t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  
changes  i n  r e w a r d s  i s  t h e  same f o r  i n t e r f i r m  and  i n t r a f i r m  s h i f t s  c a n  be  
r e j e c t e d  a t  t h e  . O 1  l e v e l  t x 2  w i t h  9 d e g r e e s  o f  f r eedom = 2 6 5 . 6 ) . 2 6  T h i s  
h y p o t h e s i s  can  a l s o  be r e j e c t e d  a t  t h e  same l e v e l  even  when l a t e r a l  j o b  
s h i f t s  a r e  e x c l u d e d  and  when o n l y  j o b  s h i f t s  i n v o l v i n g  g a i n s  and l o s s e s  a r e  
i n c l u d e d .  Thus, i t  seems c l e a r  t h a t  t h e  p a t t e r n  o f  g a i n s  and  l o s s e s  i n  j o b  
r e w a r d s  d i f f e r s  f o r  i n t e r f i r m  and  i n t r a f i r m  j o b  s h i f t s .  
How t h e s e  p a t t e r n s  d i f f e r  i s  o f  c o n s i d e r a b l e  i n t e r e s t  f o r  t h e  i s s u e s  
d i s c u s s e d  i n  S e c t i o n  11. The f r a c t i o n  o f  c e r t a i n  s h i f t s  i s  v e r y  s i m i l a r  
b o t h  w i t h i n  and  o u t  o f  a  f i r m :  s h i f t s  w i t h  b o t h  a  p r e s t i g e  and  a  wage 
g a i n ,  and s h i f t s  w i t h  t h e  same wage and e i t h e r  a  p r e s i g e  g a i n  o r  l o s s .  B u t  
t h e r e  a r e  a l s o  some v e r y  marked  d i f f e r e n c e s .  There  i s  a  much s m a l l e r  
p r o p o r t i o n  o f  s h i f t s  w i t h i n  t h a n  o u t  o f  a  f i r m  t h a t  i n v o l v e  a  wage l o s s ,  a  
p r e s t i g e  l o s s ,  b o t h  a  wage and p r e s t i g e  l o s s ,  o r  a  g a i n  i n  one and a  l o s s  
i n  t h e  o t h e r .  On t h e  o t h e r  hand, t h e r e  i s  a  much l a r q e r  p r o p o r t i o n  o f  
s h i f t s  w i t h i n  t h a n  o u t  o f  a  f i r m  t h a t  i n v o l v e  no change i n  e i t h e r  p r e s t i g e  
o r  t h e  wage, and t h a t  i n v o l v e  a  wage g a i n  b u t  no  change i n  p r e s t i g e .  
The n a t u r e  o f  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e s  f o u n d  i n  T a b l e  4 i s  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  t h e  
h y p o t h e s i s  t h a t  t h e  c o n d i t i o n s  o f  employment  w i t h i n  l a r g e  f i r m s  a r e  more 
i n f l e x i b l e  t h a n  t h o s e  i n  s m a l l  f i r m s .  (As  d i s c u s s e d  e a r l i e r ,  t h i s  assumes 
t h a t  s h i f t s  w i t h i n  s m a l l  f i r m s  a r e  a  v e r y  s m a l l  p r o p o r t i o n  o f  i n t r a f i r m  
s h i f t s . )  The j o i n t  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  p r e s t i g e  and wage changes  i s  much more 
n e a r l y  b a l a n c e d  f o r  i n t e r f i r m  s h i f t s  t h a n  f o r  i n t r a f i r m  s h i f t s .  
Nevertheless, the f r a c t i o n  o f  g a i n s  outweighs the  f r a c t i o n  o f  losses  even 
f o r  s h i f t s  ou t  o f  a  f i r m .  One would n o t  expect t h i s  imbalance i f  
employment c o n d i t i o n s  were f l e x i b l e .  Th i s  f i n d i n g  may a r i s e  because some 
i n t e r f i r m  s h i f t s  a re  from jobs i n  l a rge  f i rms ,  i n  which employment i s  
i n f l e x i b l e .  
Even though t he  d i s t r i b u t i o n s  o f  reward changes f o r  i n t r a -  and 
i n t e r f i r m  s h i f t s  are s t r i k i n g l y  d i f f e r e n t ,  the e f f e c t s  o f  rewards and 
resources on the r a t e  o f  a  job s h i f t  cou ld  be the same. To examine t h i s  
issue, I  est imated Models I V A  and I V B  f o r  the r a t e  o f  a  job s h i f t  f o r  a l l  
18 types o f  s h i f t s .  Space l i m i t a t i o n s  prevent  me from r e p o r t i n g  these 
r e s u l t s  i n  t h e i r  e n t i r e t y . = '  I  focus on two main types o f  reward changes 
f o r  s h i f t s  w i t h i n  and o u t  o f  a  f i r m :  those w i t h  a  g a i n  i n  b o t h  p r e s t i g e  
and the wage r a t e  (upward s h i f t s ) ,  and those w i t h  a l o s s  i n  bo th  (downward 
s h i f t s ) .  I  a l so  make occas ional  remarks about those w i t h  no change i n  bo th  
( l a t e r a l  s h i f t s ) .  Resu l t s  f o r  Model I V B  f o r  the f o u r  main types  o f  s h i f t s  
are g i v e n  i n  Tables 5  and 6. 
[Tab le  5  about here1 
Consider the r e s u l t s  f o r  s h i f t s  out of  a  f i r m .  F i r s t ,  the percentage 
reduc t i on  i n  the var iance  i n  the  r a t e  t h a t  r e s u l t s  from i n c l u d i n g  the  s i x  
observed exp lana to ry  v a r i a b l e s  i s  q u i t e  h i g h  f o r  upward i n t e r f i r m  s h i f t s  
(69%), much sma l le r  f o r  downward i n t e r f i r m  s h i f t s  ( 2 2 2 1 ,  and s t i l l  sma l le r  
f o r  l a t e r a l  i n t e r f i r m  s h i f t s  (5%). The s u b s t a n t i a l  r e d u c t i o n  i n  the 
var iance  f o r  upward i n t e r f i r m  s h i f t s  suggests t ha t ,  t o  a  cons iderab le  
ex ten t ,  workers l eav ing  a  f i r m  f o r  a  b e t t e r  job judge t h e i r  new job and are 
judged by t h e i r  new employers i n  terms of  these observed v a r i a b l e s .  These 
v a r i a b l e s  may e x p l a i n  upward  i n t e r f i r m  s h i f t s  b e t t e r  t h a n  downward 
i n t e r f i r m  s h i f t s  because many downward s h i f t s  r e s u l t s  f r o m  l a y - o f f s  due t o  
exogenous changes i n  demand f o r  t h e  p r o d u c t  o f  t h e  f i r m  l e f t ,  r a t h e r  t h a n  
f r o m  f i r i n g s  due t o  t h e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  a  p a r t i c u l a r  j o b - p e r s o n  match .  
L a t e r a l  i n t e r f i r m  s h i f t s  may o c c u r  f o r  v a r i o u s  r e a s o n s  q u i t e  u n r e l a t e d  t o  
r e w a r d s  and r e s o u r c e s ,  so  I d i d  n o t  e x p e c t  t h e  r a t e  o f  such  s h i f t s  t o  
depend much on t h e s e  s i x  v a r i a b l e s .  
Tu rn  n e x t  t o  t h e  p a t t e r n  o f  e f f e c t s  o f  t h e  s i x  v a r i a b l e s  on t h e  r a t e  o f  
an  upward  i n t e r f i r m  s h i f t .  As p r e d i c t e d  by i m p e r f e c t  c o m p e t i t i o n ,  t h i s  
r a t e  r i s e s  w i t h  p e r s o n a l  r e s o u r c e s  and f a l l s  u i t h  c u r r e n t  j o b  rewards .  A l l  
e f f e c t s  a r e  s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  t h e  . 0 5  l e v e l .  Now l o o k  a t  t h e  r a t e  o f  a  
downward i n t e r f i r m  s h i f t .  As,  p r e d i c t e d  by  i m p e r f e c t  c o m p e t i t i o n ,  t h i s  r a t e  
t e n d s  t o  d e c l i n e  w i t h  r e s o u r c e s  and r i s e  w i t h  r e w a r d s .  
Thus f a r  we have seen t h a t  t h e  r e s u l t s  f o r  upward  and downward s h i f t s  
o u t  o f  a  f i r m  a g r e e  w e l l  w i t h  t h e  h y p o t h e s e s  p r e d i c t e d  by i m p e r f e c t  
-
c o m p e t i t i o n .  T h i s  f i t s  my c l a i m  t h a t  i n t e r f i r m  s h i f t s  o r i g i n a t e  i n  j o b s  
gove rned  by  f l e x i b l e  employment, a s  w e l l  a s  i n  some g o v e r n e d  by  i n f l e x i b l e  
employment. I n  c o n t r a s t ,  I a rgued  t h a t  v i r t u a l l y  a l l  i n t r a f i r m  s h i f t s  
o r i g i n a t e  i n  j o b s  g o v e r n e d  by  i n f l e x i b l e  employment .  The ma in  i m p l i c a t i o n  
o f  my argument  i s  t h a t  t h e  r a t e  o f  downward i n t r a f i r m  s h i f t s  i s  v e r y  s m a l l .  
T h i s  h y p o t h e s i s  i s  s t r o n g l y  s u p p o r t e d  by t h e  r e s u l t s  i n  T a b l e  4, w h i c h  show 
t h a t  l e s s  t h a n  2% o f  a l l  i n t r a f i r m  s h i f t s  l e a d  t o  l o s s e s  i n  b o t h  p r e s t i g e  
and wages. I n  f a c t ,  t h e  number o f  downward i n t r a f i r m  s h i f t s  i s  so s m a l l  
( 1 2 )  t h a t  t h e  e i g h t  p a r a m e t e r s  o f  Model I V B  c a n n o t  be  e s t i m a t e d  f r o m  t h e s e  
d a t a .  The r a r i t y  o f  downuard i n t r a f i r m  s h i f t s  i s  c l e a r  e v i d e n c e  t h a t  
i n t r a f i r m  j o b  s h i f t s  a r e  a lmos t  a lways  f r o m  jobs  governed by i n f l e x i b l e  
employment. 
How c o n s i d e r  t h e  e f f e c t s  o f  t h e  s i x  e x p l a n a t o r y  v a r i a b l e s  on t h e  r a t e  
o f  an upward i n t r a f i r m  s h i f t  ( t h e  p r o m o t i o n  r a t e ,  f o r  s h o r t ) :  does t h e  
observed p a t t e r n  f i t  t h e  p r e d i c t i o n s  o f  j o b  c o m p e t i t i o n ,  vacancy 
c o m p e t i t i o n ,  o r  n e i t h e r  o f  t h e s e ?  
Bo th  j o b  and vacancy c o m p e t i t i o n  p r e d i c t  t h a t  t h e  p r o m o t i o n  r a t e  
i n c r e a s e s  w i t h  f i x e d  r e s o u r c e s .  The r e s u l t s  s u p p o r t  t h i s  h y p o t h e s i s  i n  t h e  
case o f  e d u c a t i o n ,  wh ich  i s  u s u a l l y  r e g a r d e d  as a  person's p r i m a r y  f i x e d  
resou rce ,  and v e r b a l  a b i l i t y .  Fa the r ' s  e d u c a t i o n  i s  i n s i g n i f i c a n t ,  as  
h y p o t h e s i z e d .  T h i s  i s  p l a u s i b l e  i f  t h i s  v a r i a b l e  i s  a  p r o x y  f o r  
i n f o r m a t i o n  about  b e t t e r  j obs .  (Such i n f o r m a t i o n  i s  r a r e l y  r e l e v a n t  
i n s o f a r  as i n t r a f i r m  s h i f t s  a r e  concerned. )  
Job and vacancy c o m p e t i t i o n  d i f f e r  i n  t h e i r  p r e d i c t i o n s  abou t  t h e  
e f f e c t s  o f  j o b  rewards  on t h e  p r o m o t i o n  r a t e :  t h e  e f f e c t  i s  p o s i t i v e  
a c c o r d i n g  t o  j o b  c o m p e t i t i o n ,  b u t  n e g a t i v e  a c c o r d i n g  t o  vacancy 
c o m p e t i t i o n .  T a b l e  5 shows t h a t  t h e  p r o m o t i o n  r a t e  decreases a s  p r e s t i g e  
and wages r i s e ,  a l t h o u g h  t h e  e s t i m a t e d  e f f e c t  i s  s t a t i s t i c a l l y  s i g n i f i c a n t  
o n l y  i n  t h e  case o f  p r e s t i g e .  Thus, t hese  r e s u l t s  s u p p o r t  t h e  p r e d i c t i o n  
o f  vacancy c o m p e t i t i o n  -- n o t  j o b  c o m p e t i t i o n .  
A f i n a l  p r e d i c t i o n  o f  vacancy c o m p e t i t i o n  i s  t h a t  t i m e  i n  j o b s  has  a  
n e g l i g i b l e  e f f e c t  on t h e  p r o m o t i o n  r a t e  when rewards  and f i x e d  r e s o u r c e s  
a r e  c o n t r o l l e d .  The c o e f f i c i e n t  o f  t h i s  v a r i a b l e  does n o t  d i f f e r  
s i g n i f i c a n t l y  f r o m  z e r o  ( a s  p r e d i c t e d  by vacancy c o m p e t i t i o n ) .  But  i t  i s  
p o s i t i v e ,  and i t  i s  n o t  a p p r e c i a b l y  s m a l l e r  i n  magn i tude t h a n  i n  t h e  case 
o f  upward i n t e r f i r m  s h i f t s .  Hence i t  i s  u n c l e a r  whether t i m e  i n  j o b s  
measures t h e  gap between a c t u a l  and expec ted  r e u a r d s  ( a s  Sorensen c l a i m s )  
o r  i s  an i n d i c a t o r  o f  a c q u i r e d  r e s o u r c e s  ( a s  human c a p i t a l  t h e o r i s t s  
a s s e r t ) .  F u r t h e r  r e s e a r c h  i s  necessa ry  t o  c l a r i f y  t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  i s s u e .  
Nex t  n o t i c e  t h e  r e d u c t i o n  i n  t h e  v a r i a n c e  i n  t h e  p r o m o t i o n  r a t e  t h a t  
r e s u l t s  f r o m  i n c l u s i o n  o f  t h e  s i x  e x p l a n a t o r y  v a r i a b l e s .  I t  i s  42.4%, 
wh ich  i s  c o n s i d e r a b l y  l ower  t h a n  t h e  69.4% r e d u c t i o n  i n  t h e  r a t e  o f  upuard  
i n t e r f i r m  s h i f t s .  These r e l a t i v e  v a l u e s  agree w i t h  my h y p o t h e s i s  t h a t  
unobserved a t t r i b u t e s  o f  j o b s  and worke rs  a f f e c t  t h e  r a t e  o f  an upuard  
i n t r a f i r m  s h i f t  more t h a n  t h e  r a t e  o f  an upuard  i n t e r f i r m  s h i f t .  
F i n a l l y ,  some hypo theses  men t ioned  i n  S e c t i o n  11.4 conce rn  t h e  e f f e c t s  
o f  e a s i l y  observed r e w a r d s  and r e s o u r c e s  on t h e  p r o m o t i o n  r a t e  r e l a t i v e  t o  
t h e i r  e f f e c t  on t h e  r a t e  o f  an upuard  i n t e r f i r m  s h i f t .  I argued t h a t  
e a s i l y  observed i n d i c a t o r s  o f  r e u a r d s  and r e s o u r c e s  i n f l u e n c e  t h e  p r o m o t i o n  
r a t e  l e s s  t h a n  t h e  r a t e  o f  an upuard  i n t e r f i r m  s h i f t .  The f i n d i n g s  
u n i f o r m l y  s u p p o r t  t h e  hypo theses :  t h e  magn i tude o f  each e a s i l y  observed 
i n d i c a t o r  o f  rewards  and r e s o u r c e s  i s  g r e a t e r  i n  t h e  case o f  t h e  r a t e  o f  an 
upward i n t e r f i r m  t h a n  i n  t h e  case o f  t h e  p r o m o t i o n  r a t e .  Moreover,  a b i l i t y  
has  a  much l a r g e r  e f f e c t  on t h e  p r o m o t i o n  r a t e  t h a n  on t h e  r a t e  o f  an 
upwdrd i n t e r f  i r m  s h i f t .  
CONCLUSIONS 
I n  t h i s  r e s e a r c h  1 have u n d e r t a k e n  t h r e e  main  t a s k s :  ( 1 )  1 have 
examined t b e  i m p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  j o b - s h i f t  p a t t e r n s  o f  s e v e r a l  a rguments  
( i m p e r f e c t  c o m p e t i t i o n ,  j o b  c o m p e t i t i o n ,  and  vacancy  c o m p e t i t i o n )  a b o u t  t h e  
way p e o p l e  w i t h  v a r y i n g  r e s o u r c e s  ( e . g . ,  e d u c a t i o n ,  a b i l i t y )  a r e  a l l o c a t e d  
t o  j o b s  w i t h  d i f f e r e n t  r e u a r d s  ( e . g . ,  p r e s t i g e ,  wages) .  ( 2 )  I have  
p r o p o s e d  an e x t e n s i o n  o f  e x i s t i n g  me thods  o f  a n a l y z i n g  j o b  s h i f t s .  ( 3 )  I 
have  u s e d  t h e  p r o p o s e d  me thod  on  d a t a  on  j o b  s h i f t s  o f  w h i t e  m a l e s  ages  
30-39 i n  1968 t o  t e s t  h y p o t h e s e s  a r i s i n g  f r o m  v a r i o u s  a rgumen ts .  I n  
d i s c u s s i n g  each  o f  t h e  t h r e e  t a s k s ,  I r e a c h e d  a number o f  d i f f e r e n t  
c o n c l u s i o n s  -- f a r  t o o  many t o  summar ize  a l l  o f  them h e r e .  I s h a l l  m e n t i o n  
o n l y  t h e  mos t  i m p o r t a n t  p o i n t s .  
1. Employment c o n d i t i o n s  s u r r o u n d i n g  a  j o b  may be  f l e x i b l e  o r  
i n f l e x i b l e .  F l e x i b l e  emp loyment  means t h a t  an e m p l o y e r  c a n  f r e e l y  a d j u s t  a  
wo rke r ' s  wage and t e r m i n a t e  h i s  j ob ;  i n f l e x i b l e  emp loyment  means t h a t  an  
e m p l o y e r  i s  c o n s t r a i n e d  ( i f  n o t  c o m p l e t e l y  p r e v e n t e d )  i n  t a k i n g  e i t h e r  
c o u r s e  o f  a c t i o n .  When emp loyment  i s  f l e x i b l e ,  a  p e r s o n ' s  g a i n  f r o m  a  j o b  
s h i f t  i s  z e r o  on  t h e  ave rage ,  and  m o b i l i t y ,  t h o u g h  a n  i n t e r e s t i n g  
phenomenon, i s  n o t  t e r r i b l y  i m p o r t a n t  f o r  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  
r e w a r d s  among p e r s o n s  o r  o v e r  one pe r son ' s  c a r e e r .  When emp loyment  i s  
i n f l e x i b l e ,  a  pe r son ' s  g a i n  f r o m  a  j o b  s h i f t  i s  p o s i t i v e  on  t h e  ave rage ,  
and  m o b i l i t y  i s  o f  f u n d a m e n t a l  i m p o r t a n c e  f o r  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  t h e  
d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  r e w a r d s .  W e t h e r  employment  i s  f l e x i b l e  o r  i n f l e x i b l e ,  
h y p o t h e s e s  can  be d e r i v e d  c o n c e r n i n g  t h e  e f f e c t s  t f  r e w a r d s ,  r e s o u r c e s ,  and  
work  e x p e r i e n c e  on  employment  s t a b i l i t y  and  t h e  r e l a t i v e  f r e q u e n c y  o f  
d i f f e r e n t  k i n d s  o f  j o b s  s h i f t s .  
2. These h y p o t h e s e s  c a n  be t r a n s l a t e d  i n t o  m o d e l s  o f  t h e  i n s t a n t a n o u e s  
r a t e  o f  a  s h i f t  f r o m  one k i n d  o f  j o b  t o  a n o t h e r .  P r e v i o u s  m o d e l s  have  
assumed t h a t  t h e  r a t e  o f  a  j o b  s h i f t  depends e i t h e r  on  o b s e r v a b l e  v a r i a b l e s  
o r  on u n o b s e r v a b l e  v a r i a b l e s .  I p r o p o s e  c o m b i n i n g  t h e s e  a s s u m p t i o n s .  I n  
-
t h i s  uay  one a v o i d s  t h e  u n r e a l i s t i c  a s s u m p t i o n  t h a t  t h e  model o f  t h e  r a t e  
o f  a  j o b  s h i f t  h a s  been s p e c i f i e d  p e r f e c t l y .  I t  a l s o  l e t s  one e s t i m a t e  t h e  
p r o p o r t i o n  o f  v a r i a n c e  i n  t h e  r a t e s  w i t h i n  some p o p u l a t i o n  t h a t  i s  
e x p l a i n e d  b y  some s e t  o f  o b s e r v e d  e x p l a n a t o r y  v a r i a b l e s .  
3. For  young w h i t e  men i n  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s ,  t h e  p r o p o r t i o n  o f  j o b  
s h i f t s  accompan ied  by  g a i n s  ( i n  e i t h e r  p r e s t i g e  o r  uages )  exceed  t h o s e  
accompan ied  b y  l o s s e s .  T h i s  t endency  i s  e s p e c i a l l y  marked  f o r  i n t r a f i r m  
s h i f t s  b u t  a l s o  n o t i c e a b l e  f o r  i n t e r f i r m  s h i f t s .  T h i s  f i n d i n g  i s  
c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  t h e  a rgumen t  t h a t  employment  t e n d s  t o  b e  i n f l e x i b l e  i n  
l a r g e  f i r m s  and f l e x i b l e  i n  s m a l l  ones, assuming  t h a t  i n t r a f i r m  s h i f t s  
o r i g i n a t e  m a i n l y  i n  l a r g e  f i r m s  and t h a t  i n t e r f i r m  s h i f t s  o r i g i n a t e  p a r t l y  
i n  s m a l l  f i r m s  and p a r t l y  i n  l a r g e  ones.  
I examined  t h e  e f f e c t s  o f  s e v e r a l  f i x e d  r e s o u r c e s  ( v e r b a l  a b i l i t y ,  own 
e d u c a t i o n ,  f a t h e r ' s  e d u c a t i o n ) ,  two  j o b  r e w a r d s  ( p r e s t i g e  and  wages),  and  
t i m e  i n  j o b s  ( a n  a c q u i r e d  r e s o u r c e  a c c o r d i n g  t o  human c a p i t a l  t h e o r y )  on  
r a t e s  o f  upward  and downward s h i f t s  u i t h i n  and be tween  f i r m s .  The f i n d i n g s  
f o r  i n t e r f i r m  s h i f t s  a g r e e  w e l l  w i t h  h y p o t h e s e s  p r e d i c t e d  b y  i m p e r f e c t  
c o m p e t i t i o n ,  w h i c h  assumes employment  i s  f l e x i b l e .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  t h e  
r e s u l t s  f o r  i n t r a f i r m  s h i f t s  s u p p o r t  a l l  b u t  one h y p o t h e s i s  p r e d i c t e d  b y  
vacancy  c o m p e t i t i o n ,  w h i c h  assumes employment  i s  i n f l e x i b l e .  
O v e r a l l  t h e s e  f i n d i n g s  i m p l y  t h a t  m o b i l i t y  i s  nat j u s t  an i n t e r e s t i n g  
s i d e  i s s u e  i n  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  r e w a r d s  i n  t h e  U n i t e d  
S t a t e s .  S h i f t i n g  j o b s  may n o t  be t h e  o n l y  mechanism b y  w h i c h  p e o p l e  
i n c r e a s e  t h e i r  j o b  r e w a r d s ,  b u t  i t  i s  ' c e r t a i n l y  one  s u c h  mechan ism,  
a p p a r e n t l y  a n  i m p o r t a n t  one.  
APPENDIX A  
T h i s  a p p e n d i x  o u t l i n e s  i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  t h e  a s s u m p t i o n  t h a t  t h e  
i n s t a n t a n e o u s  r a t e  o f  a  t r a n s i t i o n  f r o m  s t a t e  j t o  s t a t e  k f o r  some 
i n d i v i d u a l  i, r i j k )  i s  t h e  p r o d u c t  o f  two t e r m s :  A i j k ,  a  f u n c t i o n  o f  
o b s e r v a b l e  v a r i a b l e s  d e s c r i b i n g  i, j and k ;  and E i j k ,  a  g a m m a - d i s t r i b u t e d  
random d i s t u r b a n c e  r e p r e s e n t i n g  p u r e  n o i s e  ( i n c l u d i n g  u n o b s e r v a b l e  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  i t  j and k t h a t  a r e  u n c o r r e l a t e d  w i t h  t h e  o b s e r v a b l e  
v a r i a b l e s  i n  A i  j k ) .  Thus, I assume t h a t  
where 
(A. 1 )  
(A. 2 )  
(A.  3 )  
(A. 4 )  
(A.  5) 
f o r  a l l  i, j and k .  
I n  t h i s  p a p e r  I a l s o  assume t h a t  B i j k  = B j k  f o r  any p a r t i c u l a r  j and k 
and f o r  a l l  i, and t h a t  log, A i j k  = log, r i j k  a s  s p e c i f i e d  f o r  one o f  t h e  
m o d e l s  w i t h  Form A  i n  T a b l e  2  ( i . e , ,  IA ,  I I A ,  I I I A ,  o r  I V A ) .  The s t e p s  
t h a t  f o l l o w  do n o t  depend on  t h e  f u n c t i o n a l  f o r m  r e l a t i n g  A i j k  t o  o b s e r v e d  
e x p l a n a t o r y  v a r i a b l e s .  Moreover ,  i t  c o u l d  be  assumed, f o r  example ,  t h a t  
wh ich  wou ld  i m p l y  t h a t  t h e  v a r i a n c e  i n  t h e  t r a n s i t i o n  r a t e  f r o m  j t o  k 
depends on t h e  v e c t o r  o f  obse rved  v a r i a b l e s  x i j k .  The e n s u i n g  d e r i v a t i o n s  
a r e  exp ressed  i n  t e r n s  o f  A i j k  and B i j k  t o  r e t a i n  g e n e r a l i t y .  
T o g e t h e r  (A.1) and ( A . 5 )  i m p l y  t h a t  each t r a n s i t i o n  r a t e  r i j k  i s  gamma- 
d i s t r i b u t e d  w i t h  p r o b a b i l i t y  d e n s i t y :  
(A. 7)  
B i j k  ( B i  j k - 1 )  
f ( r i j k )  = (B;<k/A;;k) r i  j k  e x p i  - B i j k  r i j k / A i j k l  (A. 8 )  
r t B i  j k )  
The above e x p r e s s i o n  i m p l i e s  t h a t  t h e  r a t e  r i j k  h a s  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  mean and 
v a r i a n c e  : 
(A. 9) 
2 
V a r ( r i j k )  = A i j k I B i j k  (A. 10)  
S i n c e  t r a n s i t i o n  r a t e s  a r e  u n o b s e r v a b l e  v a r i a b l e s ,  (A.8) c a n n o t  be  used  
t o  e s t i m a t e  A i j k  and B i j k  d i r e c t l y .  However, ( A . 8 )  c a n  b e  used t o  deduce 
t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  d e n s i t y  o f  v a r i o u s  o b s e r v a b l e  v a r i a b l e s .  G iven  d a t a  on one 
o f  t h e s e  o b s e r v a b l e  v a r i a b l e s ,  t h e  method o f  maximum l i k e l i h o o d  c a n  t h e n  b e  
used  t o  e s t i m a t e  A i j k  and B i j k .  
I assume t h a t  e v e n t  h i s t o r y  d a t a  a r e  a v a i l a b l e  so  t h a t  one knows t h e  
number, t i m i n g ,  and sequence o f  e v e n t s .  Nore c o n c r e t e l y ;  I assume t h a t  t h e  
v a l u e s  o f  t,, t h e  t i m e  o f  t h e  n t h  event ,  and yn, t h e  s t a t e  e n t e r e d  a t  t h e  
n t h  event ,  a r e  observed f o r  n  = 0 t o  some number t h a t  v a r i e s  f r o m  case t o  
case.  The o b s e r v a t i o n s  on t h e  t i m e s  o f  s u c c e s s i v e  e v e n t s  p r o v i d e  
i n f ' o r m a t i o n  on t h e  d u r a t i o n  i n  a  s t a t e  j = Y,-1 because u, = tn - tn-1. 
Below I s k e t c h  t h e  d e r i v a t i o n  o f  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  d e n s i t y  o f  tn and t h e  
expec ted  v a l u e  o f  r i j k  i n  t h e  p o p u l a t i o n .  
Because r i j k  i s  a  c o n s t a n t  f o r  any i, j and k by t h e  assumpt ion  i n  
(A. 1 1 ,  t h e  t i m e  o f  l e a v i n g  t h e  (n -11 th  job, t,-q, c o n d i t i o n a l  on t h e  t y p e  
o f  j o b  j = y,-? and t h e  t i m e  o f  e n t r y  tn-1, has an e x p o n e n t i a l  d i s t r i b u t i o n  
u i  t h  p r o b a b i  1 i t y  d e n s i t y :  
where 
(A. 12) 
No te  t h a t  (A.11) i s  a  c o n d i t i o n a l  d e n s i t y :  t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  t, depends 
on t h e  unobse rvab le  h a z a r d  f u n c t i o n  h i j  as  g i v e n  by  (A.121, as  w e l l  a s  on 
t B u t  t o  e s t i m a t e  pa ramete rs  f r o m  data ,  one needs a  d e n s i t y  o f  t, t h a t  
depends o n l y  on o b s e r v a b l e s .  T h i s  can be o b t a i n e d  by  m u l t i p l y i n g  t h e  
c o n d i t i o n a l  d e n s i t y  i n  (A.11) t i m e s  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  d e n s i t y  o f  t h e  h a z a r d  
f u n c t i o n ,  and t h e n  i n t e g r a t i n g  ove r  a l l  p o s s i b l e  v a l u e s  o f  each h i j k  ( i . e . ,  
f r o m  0 t o  0 0 ) .  
f j ( t n ( t n - 1 )  = J f j ( t n ( t n - l , h i j )  f ( h i j )  d h i j  (A. 13)  
E q u a t i o n  (A.11)  p r o v i d e s  t h e  f i r s t  t e r m  w i t h i n  t h e  i n t e g r a l .  The second 
t e r m  i s  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  d e n s i t y  o f  t h e  h a z a r d  f u n c t i o n  f o r  i n d i v i d u a l  i i n  
s t a t e  j, w h i c h  h a s  n o t  y e t  been s p e c i f i e d .  ( E q u a t i o n  (A.8)  g i v e s  o n l y  t h e  
p r o b a b i l i t y  d e n s i t y  f o r  a  p a r t i c u l a r  t r a n s i t i o n  r a t e . )  
Though i t  i s  r e a s o n a b l e  t o  assume t h a t  i n  g e n e r a l  t r a n s i t i o n  r a t e s  t o  
d i f f e r e n t  s t a t e s  a r e  not s t a t i s t i c a l l y  i ndependen t ,  i . e . ,  t h a t  the .  
d i s t u r b a n c e s  f o r  d i f f e r e n t  t r a n s i t i o n  r a t e s  a r e  c o r r e l a t e d ,  t h e  succeed ing  
s t e p s  i n  t h e  d e r i v a t i o n  a r e  eno rmous l y  s i m p l i f i e d  by  assuming s t a t i s t i c a l  
independence.  Then t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  d e n s i t y  o f  t h e  h a z a r d  f u n c t i o n  i s  j u s t  
t h e  p r o d u c t  o f  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  d e n s i t i e s  f o r  t r a n s i t i o n  r a t e s  f r o m  t h e  
s t a t e  j t o  a l l  p o s s i b l e  s t a t e s :  
where (A.8) g i v e s  f ( r i j k ) .  S i m i l a r l y  
(A. 14)  
(A. 15)  
Thus, t h e  s i n g l e  i n t e g r a t i o n  i n  (A.13)  becomes a  m u l t i p l e ,  $'-fold 
i n t e g r a t i o n .  
One need o n l y  s u b s t i t u t e  (A.111, (A.14)  and (A .15)  i n t o  (A.13) and 
i n t e g r a t e  t o  o b t a i n  a  p r o b a b i l i t y  d e n s i t y  f o r  tn t h a t  does  n o t  depend on 
any  u n o b s e r v a b l e s .  Numerous t e d i o u s  b u t  s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d  s t e p s  y i e l d :  
'4 '4 
f  j t n t n  = 1 A . .  B . .  ? ? I f  II B ~ < I ,  (A. 16)  
k = l  A i j k  U n  + B i j k  k = I  A i j k  U n ' +  B i j k  
E q u a t i o n  (A.16) i m p l i e s  t h a t  t h e  s u r v i v o r  f u n c t i o n  f o r  a  case i s e l e c t e d  a t  
random i s :  
'4' 
G j ( t n l t n - l )  = II B i i t  
k = I  A i j k  U n  + B i j k  
(A. 17) 
Moreover, t h e  u n c o n d i t i o n a l  r a t e  o f  l e a v i n g  j a t  t i m e  tn i s  r e l a t e d  t o  
t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  d e n s i t y  f u n c t i o n  f o r  t n  and t h e  s u r v i v o r  f u n c t i o n  a t  t n  a s  
f o l l o w s :  
f  j ( t n ) t n - 1 ) / ~ j ( t ~ ( t ~ - q I  = h i  j ( tn l tn-1)  (A. 18) 
( A .  19) 
So (A.16) t h r o u g h  (A.19) i m p l y  t h a t  t h e  r a t e  o f  l e a v i n g  j ( t h e  haza rd  
f u n c t i o n )  f o r  a  randomly  s e l e c t e d  case i i s :  
I t  c a n  be shown i n  an ana logous  f a s h i o n  t h a t  f o r  a  randomly  s e l e c t e d  case i 
FOOTNOTES 
1. For a  u s e f u l  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  ways o f  d e f i n i n g  l a b o r  marke t  s t r u c t u r e ,  see 
A1 t h a u s e r  and K a l  1  eberg,  1981. 
Sorensen and K a l l e b e r g  (1981) and Sorensen and Tuma (1981) d i s t i n g u i s h -  
between "open" and "c losed"  employment* An employer i s  f r e e  t o  
t e r m i n a t e  an employee's j o b  i n  t h e  fo rmer ,  b u t  n o t  i n  t h e  l a t t e r .  
These a u t h o r s  i m p l i c i t l y  assume t h a t  w&e r i g i d i t y  accompanies c l o s e d  
employment and t h a t  wage f l e x i b i l i t y  i s  p r e s e n t  when employmgnt i s  
open. Bu t  t h i s  need n o t  be t h e  case.  I use a  d i f f e r e n t  t e r m i n o l o g y  t o  
emphasize t h a t  both r i g i d  wages and c l o s e d  employment a r e  necessa ry  f o r  
t h e  c o n c l u s i o n s  reached about  i n f l e x i b l e  employment below. 
3. For  ev idence  o f  t h e  f i r s t ,  see B l a u  and Duncan, 1967. For  e v i d e n c e  o f  
t h e  second, see f i i n c e r ,  1974. Byrne (1975) and Hayghe (1975) g i v e  
ev idence  o f  t h e  t h i r d .  Numerous o t h e r  sour-ces c o u l d  be c i t e d .  
4. An a d d i t i o n a l  assumpt ion  i s  t h a t  b u y e r s  and s e l l e r s  max imize  u t i l i t y :  
employers  max imize  p r o f i t s ,  and w o r k e r s  max imize  u t i l i t y  t h a t  depends 
on l e i s u r e ,  money, and o c c a s i o n a l l y  o t h e r ,  nonpecun ia ry  v a l u e s .  
5. The r a t e  o f  a  j o b  s h i f t  i s  ana logous t o  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  s h i f t  
p e r  u n i t  o f  t i m e  among those  a t  r i s k  o f  t h e  s h i f t .  A  f o r m a l  d e f i n i t i o n  
i s  g i v e n  i n  e q u a t i o n  ( 4 )  be low.  
6. Ano the r  aspec t  d e a l s  u i t h  i n v e s t m e n t s  s p e c i f i c  t o  t h e  match, e.g.,  j ob -  
s p e c i f i c  t r a i n i n g .  BLfi a rgue t h a t  s t a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  match i n c r e a s e s  
u i t h  s p e c i f i c  i n v e s t m e n t s .  See a l s o  Becker,  1964; Tuma, 1976. T h i s  
argument  a l s o  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  t h e  r a t e  o f  a  s h i f t  d e c l i n e s  a s  t h e  
d u r a t i o n  o f  t h e  ma tch  i n c r e a s e s .  Tuma (1976)  and Sorensen and Tuma 
(1981)  have  e s t i m a t e d  mode l s  i n  w h i c h  t h e  r a t e  o f  a j o b  s h i f t  d e c l i n e s  
as  d u r a t i o n  i n c r e a s e s .  T e c h n i c a l  d i f f i c u l t i e s  p r e c l u d e d  s t u d y i n g  t h e s e  
i s s u e s  i n  t h i s  p a p e r  (see  f o o t n o t e  20 b e l o w ) .  
7. Perhaps  s u r p r f s i n g l y ,  BLN a r g u e  t h a t  even p o s i t i v e  u n e x p e c t e d  g a i n s  
( i . e . ,  N w i n d f a l l s N )  dec rease  s t a b i l i t y .  They a r g u e  t h a t  t h e  ma tch  i s  
no l o n g e r  o p t i m a l  a f t e r  a  u i n d f a l l ,  w h i c h  makes t h e  match  u n s t a b l e .  
8. F o r  example, t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n  o f  t h e  c o n s t r u c t i o n  i n d u s t r y  l e a d s  t o  a  
much h i g h e r  r a t e  o f  l a t e r a l  s h i f t s  i n  t h a t  i n d u s t r y  t h a n  i n  most  
o t h e r s .  
9. Sorensen (1977a)  does n o t  e x p l a i n  why i n i t i a l  j o b  r e w a r d s  a r e  l o n e r  
t h a n  e x p e c t e d  f o r  a  g i v e n  l e v e l  o f  r e s o u r c e s .  I f  l a b o r - m a r k e t  e n t r a n t s  
a r e  dependent  upon v a c a n c i e s  i n  j o b s  whose r e w a r d s  a r e  commensurate 
w i t h  t h e i r  r e s o u r c e s ,  t h e i r  a l t e r n a t i v e s  may be t o  w a i t  u n t i l  a  
s u i t a b l e  j ob  becomes a v a i l a b l e  o r  t o  a c c e p t  a  j o b  whose r e w a r d s  a r e  
l e s s  t h a n  t h e y  e x p e c t .  G iven  t h e s e  two a l t e r n a t i v e s ,  most  i n d i v i d u a l s  
w i l l  choose t h e  l a t t e r  -- a s  l o n g  a s  t h i s  c h o i c e  does  n o t  p r e v e n t  them 
f r o m  o b t a i n i n g  a  b e t t e r  j o b  l a t e r ,  
10. Sorensen (1977a)  r e f e r s  t o  ' * t ime i n  t h e  l a b o r  f o r ce * '  r a t h e r  t h a n  "work 
e x p e r i e n c e . * *  The two c o n c e p t s  a r e  e q u i v a l e n t  when employment  i s  
c o n t i n u o u s  once t h e  l a b o r  f o r c e  i s  e n t e r e d ,  w h i c h  Sorensen assumes. I n  
r e a l i t y  and i n  t h e  d a t a  ana l yzed ,  employment i s  n o t  c o n t i n u o u s .  I n  my 
o p i n i o n  t h e  n o t i o n  o f  *'work e x p e r i e n c e , "  by w h i c h  I mean " t i m e  i n  
jobs,' '  f i t s  Sorensen 's  a rgumen ts  b e t t e r  t h a n  " t o t a l  t i m e  i n  t h e  l a b o r  
fo rce ' '  when emp loyment  i s  d i s c o n t i n u o u s .  C o n s e q u e n t l y ,  I have  
s u b s t i t u t e d  "work e x p e r i e n c e "  f o r  " t i m e  i n  t h e  l a b o r  f o r ce ' '  i n  my 
d i s c u s s i o n  o f  v a c a n c y  c o m p e t i t i o n .  F u r t h e r  p e r t i n e n t  d i s c u s s i o n  
a p p e a r s  i n  t h e  d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  t h e  d a t a  i n  S e c t i o n  111.  
1 1 .  The l a y - o f f  r a t e  ;ay be h i g h  i n  c e r t a i n  i n d u s t r i e s ,  and  l a y - o f f s  
p r o b a b l y  l e a d  t o  a  h i g h  p r o p o r t i o n  o f  downward s h i f t s .  However,  l a y -  
o f f s  a r e  n o t  t r i g g e r e d  b y  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  a  p a r t i c u l a r  j o b - p e r s o n  
m a t c h  b u t  b y  a  t e m p o r a r y  s l a c k e n e d  demand f o r  a  f i r m ' s  p r o d u c t .  
12. J o b s  a t  t h e  h i g h e s t  r u n g s  o f  a  l a r g e  f i r m  b e a r  many s i m i l a r i t i e s  t o  
j o b s  i n  s m a l l  f i r m s  i n s o f a r  a s  f l e x i b i l i t y  o f  emp loyment  i s  c o n c e r n e d .  
F o r  example ,  t o p  e x e c u t i v e s  appea r  much more l i k e l y  t h a n  t h o s e  i n  
m i d d l e  management t o  be  demoted o r  f i r e d  i f  t h e i r  j o b  p e r f o r m a n c e  does  
n o t  mee t  e x p e c t a t i o n s .  
13. L e i g h  (1976)  h a s  compared  g a i n s  o f  b l a c k s  and w h i t e s  who s h i f t  
i n d u s t r i e s  and who r e m a i n  i n  t h e  same i n d u s t r y .  F o r  b o t h  r a c e s  he  
f i n d s  t h a t  move rs  t e n d  t o  g a i n  more  t h a n  s t a y e r s .  U n f o r t u n a t e l y ,  he  
does  n o t  r e p o r t  e f f e c t s  o f  v a r i a b l e s  i n d i c a t i n g  t h e  r e s o u r c e s  o f  
w o r k e r s ,  a l t h o u g h  t h e y  were  i n c l u d e d  i n  h i s  a n a l y s i s .  
14. March  and  March  ( 1978 )  have  d e v e l o p e d  a  model o f  i n t r a f i r m  s h i f t s  based  
on  t h e  a s s u m p t i o n  t h a t  p e r f o r m a n c e  r e c o r d s  on  t h e  j o b  a r e  the c r i t e r i o n  
u s e d  b y  e m p l o y e r s  i n  a l l o c a t i n g  emp loyees  t o  d i f f e r e n t  j o b s .  
15. A l t h o u g h  i n  p r i n c i p l e  m i l i t a r y  s e r v i c e  c a n  be u n c o e r c e d ,  many 
r e s p o n d e n t s  may h a v e  been  d r a f t e d  because  t h e i r  m i l i t a r y  s e r v i c e  
o c c u r r e d  i n  t h e  e r a  o f  t h e  K o r e a n  War. 
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16. Age and t i m e  s i n c e  schoo l  c o m p l e t i o n  a r e  c o r r e l a t e d  . 8 3 2 .  
17. H i s t o r i c a l  p e r i o d  and t i m e  s i n c e  schoo l  c o m p l e t i o n  a r e  c o r r e l a t e d  . 7 2 0 .  
18. Another  approach t h a t  I have n o t  y e t  e x p l o r e d  i s  t o  assume t h a t  t h e  
change i n  rewards  i s  a  m e t r i c  v a r i a b l e  u i t h  some p o s t u l a t e d  
d i s t r i b u t i o n .  
19. I use c a p i t a l  l e t t e r s  t o  deno te  random v a r i a b l e s  and l o u e r  case l e t t e r s  
t o  i n d i c a t e  t h e i r  r e a l i z a t i o n s .  
20 .  Time-independence i s  an a d m i t t e d l y  u n r e a l i s t i c  assumpt ion .  I t  i s  easy 
t o  f o r m u l a t e  arguments  why j o b - s h i f t  r a t e s  depend on age, d u r a t i o n ,  and 
h i s t o r i c a l  p e r i o d .   or such arguments, see Tuma, 1 9 7 6 . )  B u t  i t  i s  
beyond t h e  scope o f  t h i s  paper  t o  encompass t h e s e  arguments  o r  t o  
i n c l u d e  these  v a r i a b l e s .  
2 1 .  T h i s  assumpt ion  i m p l i e s  t h a t  t h e  c o e f f i c i e n t  o f  v a r i a t i o n  i n  t h e  r a t e  
i s  U i j k .  
2 2 .  Michae l  C .  Kee ley  f i r s t  suggested t h i s  t o  me. S i n c e  I w r o t e  t h e  f i r s t  
v e r s i o n  o f  t h i s  paper ,  Heckman and h i s  a s s o c i a t e s  (Heckman and B o r j a s ,  
1980; F l i n n  and Heckman, 1982)  have a l s o  proposed models t h a t  combine 
these  f e a t u r e s .  
23. Both  S i l c o c k  and S p i l e r m a n  assume t h a t  o n l y  t h e  r a t e  o f  l e a v i n g  a  j o b  
has  a  random d i s t u r b a n c e .  
24 .  I imposed a  maximum l e n g t h  on t h e  i n t e r v a l  between s u c c e s s i v e  j o b s  
because I t h i n k  t h a t  t h e  k i n d  o f  j o b  h e l d  p r e v i o u s l y  has  a  d e c l i n i n g  
impac t  on changes i n  rewards  as t h i s  i n t e r v a l  l e n g t h e n s .  C l e a r l y  t h e  
c h o i c e  o f  a  s i x -mon th  maximum i s  a r b i t r a r y .  
25. G iven t h e  s m a l l  c o r r e l a t i o n  between p r e s t i g e  and wage changes (whether  
measured on a b s o l u t e  o r  pe rcen tage  s c a l e s ) ,  one m i g h t  e x p e c t  c e l l  
e n t r i e s  f o r  i n t r a -  and i n t e r f i r m  s h i f t s  t o  be c l o s e  t o  t h e  p r o d u c t  o f  
t h e  m a r g i n a l s  i n  Tab le  4, i n d i c a t i n g  t h a t  p r e s t i g e  and wage changes a r e  
s t a t i s t i c a l l y  i ndependen t .  T h i s  n u l l  h y p o t h e s i s  can be r e j e c t e d  a t  t h e  
.05 l e v e l  t x 2  w i t h  4 degrees o f  f reedom = 46.58 f o r  i n t e r f i r m  s h i f t s ,  
and 18.68 f o r  i n t r a f i r m  s h i f t s ) .  The main  d e v i a t i o n s  f r o m  s t a t i s t i c a l  
independence seem t o  occu r  because t h e  same changes i n  p r e s t i g e  and 
wages o c c u r  much more o f t e n  t h a n  independence p r e d i c t s .  T h i s  f i n d i n g  
does n o t ,  o f  course ,  c o n t r a d i c t  t h e  f i n d i n g  o f  a  s m a l l  c o r r e l a t i o n  
between t h e  two k i n d s  o f  changes. 
26. I a l s o  t e s t e d  t h e  h y p o t h e s i s  t h a t  t h e - r a t e s  o f  these n i n e  t y p e s  o f  
changes i n  rewards  a r e  t h e  same f o r  i n t e r f i r m  and i n t r a f i r m  j o b  s h i f t s .  
T h i s  h y p o t h e s i s  can a l s o  be r e j e c t e d  a t  w e l l  b e l o u  t h e  .O1 l e v e l  ( x 2  
w i  t h  9 deg rees  o f  f reedom = 2522.0) .  
27. There a r e  o t h e r  reasons  f o r  n o t  r e p o r t i n g  these.  I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  i t  i s  
d i f f i c u l t  t o  know whether a  move i n v o l v i n g  a  g a i n  i n  one reward  and a  
l o s s  i n  t h e  o t h e r  s h o u l d  be c o n s i d e r e d  a  n e t  g a i n ,  a  n e t  l o s s ,  o r  no 
change. Consequent ly ,  i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  know whether t h e  r e s u l t s  f o r  
t hese  s h i f t s  s u p p o r t  a  h y p o t h e s i s  o r  n o t .  
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Table 1 .  Variables used in the analysis: definitions, means, 
and standard deviati0ns.a 
Var iab le  D e f i n i t i o n  
White men 
Mean S.D. 
F a t h e r ' s  edua t ion  
Verbal a b i l i t y  
Education 
P r e s t i g e  
Wage r a t e  
Years i n  jobs 
Years s i n c e  school  
Durat ion i n  job 
(yea r s )  
Job  l e f t  (dummy 
v a r i a b l e )  
Number of 
i n d i v i d u a l s  
Number o f  matches 
F a t h e r ' s  yea r s  of  completed 
school ing  
Number of c o r r e c t  numbers on 
a 10-item word-recognition 
tes t ,  ad jus t ed  f o r  missing 
va lues  on s i n g l e  i t e m s  
Years of  completed school ing 
a t  s t a r t  of  job 
Siege1 (1970) p r e s t i g e  s c o r e  
f o r  job 
Est imated wage i n  d o l l a r s  p e r  
hour a t  s t a r t  o f  job. 
Calcu la ted  a s :  
12(Monthly earn ings  i n  $1 
52(Aver. weekly hours  worked) 
T o t a l  yea r s  i n  prev ious  jobs 
s i n c e  school ing  completed 
T o t a l  yea r s  s i n c e  school  
completed 
Las t  d a t e  i n  j ob - f i r s t  d a t e  
(based on r epo r t ed  year  and 
month f o r  each d a t e )  
1 i f  job e x i s t  observed 
0 o therwise  
a Reported means and s tandard  d e v i a t i o n s  a r e  f o r  matches,  no t  i n d i v i d u a l s .  
Table 2 .  Models f o r  t h e  r a t e  of a job s h i f t .  
Model 
number Assumption 
I A  The r a t e  of l eav ing  each  job j  i s  t h e  same f o r  e a c ! ~  i n d i v i d u a l  i. 
I B The mean r a t e  of l e a v i n g  a  job does not  depend on c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  
o f  i n d i v i d u a l  i o r  of job j .  However, t h e  r a t e  v a r i e s  due t o  ran- 
2 dom e r r o r  ("luck",  e t c . ) ,  which has  var iance U . 
loge hi j  = a  + loge Eij ,  E ( E . . )  = 1, V a r ( E . . )  = U 2 11 11 
I I A  The r a t e  of l eav ing  a  job is a  log- l inea r  func t ion  of x . . -  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of i n d i v i d u a l  i and job j .  11 
l o g  e  hi j  = a ' x . .  
11 
I I B  The mean of t h e  r a t e  o f  leaving a  job i s  a  l o g - l i n e a r  func t ion  
o f  x . . - c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of i n d i v i d u a l  i and job . The r a t e  i var ikd due t o  random e r r o r ,  which has  var iance U . 
l o g  h , .  = a ' x i j  + loge  E i j ,  E ( E . . )  = 1, Var(Eij) = Q 2 
e  11 11 
I I I A  The r a t e  of moving from one job j  t o  another job k  i s  a  c o n s t a n t  
f o r  p a r t i c u l a r  k inds  o f  jobs j  and k ,  bu t  does n o t  depend on 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of an i n d i v i d u a l  i. 
log, rijk = a j k  
I I I B  The mean r a t e  of moving from one job j  t o  another  job k depends 
on the  p a r t i c u l a r  j  and k ,  bu t  does no t  depend on c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  
of i n d i v i d u a l  i. The r a t e  v a r i e s  due t o  random e r r o r ,  which 
has  var iance a? 
l k .  
( I n  general  02  depends on j  and k.)  
1 k  
2 l o g  rijk = a j k  + loge E i j k t  E ( E .  . )  = 1, Var(Eijk) I 0 
e  11 jk 
I V A  The r a t e  of moving from one job j  t o  another job k  is a  l o g - l i n e a r  
func t ion  of c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of i n d i v i d u a l  i and job j ;  t h i s  func- 
t i o n  may depend on k-the kind of job en te red  next .  
log, rijk = a  jk ' X i j  
IVB The mean r a t e  of moving from one job j t o  another  job k  i s  a  log- 
l i n e a r  func t ion  of c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of i n d i v i d u a l  i and job j ;  
t h i s  func t ion  may depend on k-the kind of job e n t e r e d  next .  
2 The r a t e  v a r i e s  due t o  random e r r o r ,  which has  va r iance  0 .  
( I n  genera l  U2 depends on j and k . )  l k *  jk 
L 
log  r . .  = a  ' x . .  + loge E i j k r  E ( E . .  ) = 1, var(Eijk) = U 
e l j k  jk 11 ilk jk 
Table 3. Leaving a job: estimates of models IA, IB, IIA, and 
IIB. 
White men 
A  B  
Model I 
Mean rate 
L Variance, U 
Chi-square for 








Wages in $/hr 
Years in jobs 
Variance, U 2 
% decrease in 0 2 
(IIB vs. I B )  
Chi-square for model: 
vs. model I A  
(df 1 
vs. model I B  
(df 1 
vs. model I I A  
(df 1 
Number of job-person 
matches 
astatistically significant at the .10 level 
b 
statistically significant at the .05 level 
C 
statistically significant at the .O1 level 

T a b l e  5 .  U p w a r d  and d o w n w a r d  job s h i f t s  w i t h i n  and o u t  of a 
f i r m :  e s t i m a t e s  of m o d e l s  I I I A ,  I I I B ,  and I V B  f o r  
w h i t e  m e n .  
Upward Downward 
Out In  Out In  Est imates fo r :  
Model I I I A  
Mean r a t e  2 Variance, 0 .  
lk 
Model I I I B  
Mean r a t e  
Variance, 0 j k 
Chi-square f o r  
I I I B  vs. I I I A :  
(df 
Estimates f o r  model IVB 
Constant -. 840 not  e s t d  
F a t h e r ' s  education .048 b 
Verbal a b i l i t y  ,106 b 
Education 
Pres t ige  
Wages i n  $/hr C -. 838 
Years i n  jobs .030 b 
Variance, 0 2 1.936 jk - 
% decrease i n  aL 
( I V B  vs. IIIB) jk 
not ca lcd  
Chi-square f o r  model: 
vs. model I I I A  
(df 1 
not  e s t d  
7 
vs.  model I I I B  
(df 1 
not  ca lcd  
6 
vs. model IVA 
(df 1 
Number of s h i f t s  340 
Number of job-person matches = 3484 
a 
s t a t i s t i c a l l y  s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  the  -10 l e v e l  
b 
s t a t i s t i c a l l y  s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  the  .05 l e v e l  
C 
s t a t i s t i c a l l y  s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  the  . O 1  l e v e l  
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